Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Garza Rodriguez, 791 P.2d 633.

106 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. John Logan Brown Ariz. 2025
State of Arizona v. John Logan Brown Ariz. 2025
“We presume that the [L]egislature knows the existing law when it enacts or modifies a statute.”
Planned Parenthood v. Kristin mayes/hazelrigg Ariz. 2024
Planned Parenthood v. Kristin mayes/hazelrigg Ariz. 2024
This analytical approach is premised on foundational trust in legislative competency, and this Court “presume[s] that the legislature knows the existing laws when it enacts or modifies a statute.”
State v. Moering Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Moering Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Gomez 437 P.3d 896 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Gomez 437 P.3d 896 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
(courts presume legislature is aware of existing laws when it enacts new ones); ¶ 27 (App. 2011) (same).
Carey v. Soucy 431 P.3d 1200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Carey v. Soucy 431 P.3d 1200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Montes Flores 428 P.3d 502 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Montes Flores 428 P.3d 502 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Montes Flores contends case authorities have created confusion by interpreting the term inconsistently.
State v. Farnsworth 389 P.3d 88 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
State v. Farnsworth 389 P.3d 88 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
(supreme court statutory interpretation becomes part of statute); -11 , -37 (1990) (legislative amendment is presumed to change existing law, including cases interpreting prior statute).
Gila River Indian Community v. Department of Child Safety 379 P.3d 1016 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Gric v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Gila River Indian Community v. Department of Child Safety 379 P.3d 1016 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Estate of Jung, 210 Ariz. at 204, ¶ 12 , 109 P.3d at 99 .
Gric v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Estate of Jung, 210 Ariz. at 204, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d at 99.
Lewis v. Arizona State Personnel Board 379 P.3d 227 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Lewis v. Arizona State Personnel Board 379 P.3d 227 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
(noting presumption that “by amending a statute, the legislature intends to change the existing law”).
EMILY ANN McGUIRE v. STATE OF ARIZONA Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
McGuire v. Lee ex rel. County of Pima 372 P.3d 328 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
McGuire v. Lee ex rel. County of Pima 372 P.3d 328 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
-12 , -38 (1990), in which it held that a simulated weapon may be the basis for an armed robbery conviction but the simulated weapon must be present, not just suggested.
EMILY ANN McGUIRE v. STATE OF ARIZONA Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
-12, -38 (1990), in which it held that a simulated weapon may be the basis for an armed robbery conviction but the simulated weapon must be present, not just suggested.
State of Arizona v. Usef Latrice Simmons II 363 P.3d 120 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Usef Latrice Simmons II 363 P.3d 120 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
(“We presume that the legislature knows the existing laws when it enacts or modifies a statute.”); (we construe statutory provisions to be “‘harmonious and consistent’” within statutory scheme), quoting State ex rel.
State of Arizona v. Christepher E. Lua 350 P.3d 805 Ariz. 2015
State of Arizona v. Christepher E. Lua 350 P.3d 805 Ariz. 2015
§ 13-101(4) (declaring the “policy” and “general purposes” of the criminal code “[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties for each”); (concluding that A.R.S.
State of Arizona v. Lee L.N. 340 P.3d 1085 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Lee L.N. 340 P.3d 1085 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Laws, ch. 255, § 11 (renumbering as § 13-702(G))
State of Arizona v. Daniel Andrew Snider 311 P.3d 656 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Daniel Andrew Snider 311 P.3d 656 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Sun Surety Insurance Company 301 P.3d 583 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Sun Surety Insurance Company 301 P.3d 583 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
See 192 Ariz. LIV (1998) (adding to Rule 7.6(c)(1) that court shall notify surety of any violation of appearance bond); (legislative amendment of statute raises presumption of intentional change to existing law).
MacKinney v. City of Tucson 299 P.3d 1282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
MacKinney v. City of Tucson 299 P.3d 1282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Because the legislature is presumed to be aware of existing law when it enacts or modifies a statute, we agree that the comparisons in these decisions support the city’s argument that the legislature intended golf courses to be included in “other similar lands.” 7 ¶10 We find additional evidence of the legislature’s intent to i
In Re Mh2010-002637 263 P.3d 82 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
In Re Mh2010-002637 263 P.3d 82 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
In doing so, we will “give meaning to each clause and consider the effects and consequences as well as the spirit and purpose of the law.” In re MH 2007-001264, ¶ 9 , ( , ).
Ballesteros v. American Standard Insurance 248 P.3d 193 Ariz. 2011
Ballesteros v. American Standard Insurance 248 P.3d 193 Ariz. 2011
- 11 - (1990) (noting presumption that “by amending a statute, the legislature intends to change the existing law”).
Hormel v. Maricopa County 232 P.3d 768 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Hormel v. Maricopa County 232 P.3d 768 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Arizona Navigable Stream Adjudication Commission 229 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Arizona Navigable Stream Adjudication Commission 229 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Estate of Jung, 210 Ariz. at 204, ¶ 12 , 109 P.3d at 99 .
In re MH 2007-001264 189 P.3d 1111 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
In re MH 2007-001264 189 P.3d 1111 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
We also “give meaning to each clause and consider the effects and consequences as well as the spirit and purpose of the law.”
State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
5 Because we presume that the legislature understood what it was doing when it enacted these statutes, , (“We presume that the legislature knows the existing laws when it enacts or modifies a statute.”), we conclude the statutory history clearly reflects a legislative intent not to require the existence of any culpable mental state within 17-309(A), except when the text plainly requires.
Pamela Manic v. Tucson City Attorney's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Pamela Manic v. Tucson City Attorney's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
(“We presume that the legislature knows the existing laws when it enacts or modifies a statute.”).