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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Shearer, 803 P.2d 425.

13 citing documents.

  • State v. Castleberry Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    The defendant in Reaves invoked the defense to defeat a burglary charge, id., –34 (App. 1990), to establish that a defendant cannot burglarize his own home.
  • State v. Castleberry Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    The defendant in Reaves invoked the defense to defeat a burglary charge, id., –34 (App. 1990), to establish that a defendant cannot burglarize his own home.
  • State of Arizona v. James Murray Reaves, III 506 P.3d 39 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2022
    (reversing burglary conviction when “defendant had an absolute and unconditional right to 6 Reaves also argues this alleged error infected his conviction for first-degree murder.
  • State of Arizona v. Joann Bon 338 P.3d 989 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
  • State of Arizona v. Jeffrey Lee Hinden Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    § 13-302(A), the precursor statute to § 13-1501(4), specifically itemizing “construction materials” as commercial items); see also State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 434, (acknowledging former § 13-302(A) “conceptually similar” to current statute).
  • State v. Evenson 33 P.3d 780 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    (noting that courts avoid “statutory interpretation[s] that lead[] to absurd results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature”); , (“[A] statute is to be given a sensible construction that will accomplis
  • State v. Flynt 13 P.3d 1209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
  • State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    (primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute); , (statute to be construed according to evil it is designed to remedy).
  • State v. Jenkins 970 P.2d 947 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    The primary purpose of statutory construction is “to determine and give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute.” , 435, , 428 (App.1990).
  • State v. Cornish 968 P.2d 606 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    ("It is clear that although a person enters another’s premises lawfully and with consent, his presence can become unauthorized, unlicensed, or unprivileged if he remains there with the intent to commit a felony.”)
  • State v. Cramer 962 P.2d 224 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Luzanilla 861 P.2d 682 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
  • State v. Wedding 831 P.2d 398 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992