Cited by

(considering “the policy behind the statute and the evil it was designed to remedy” as evidence of legislative intent); A.R.S.

¶6 When statutory terms are not defined, we apply the “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” (); A.R.S.

State v. Korzep (Korzep III)

Almeida, ¶¶ 17-23 (crime prevention is a “more permissive” justification defense and is unique from self-defense (quoting State v. Korzep (Korzep I), )).

When terms are not defined, we apply the “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” ¶ 16 (2004) ().

We also “consider the policy behind the statute and the evil it was designed to remedy.” see also A.R.S.

Co., ¶ 7 (App. 2009) ().

“Equivalent” means: “(1) Equal in value, force, amount, effect, or significance; (2) Corresponding in effect or function; nearly equal; virtually identical.” Equivalent, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); (giving statutory language its “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning”).

(according statutory language its “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning”).

“We give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.”

¶ 12 (App. 1999) (noting we refer to a widely used and established dictionary to determine a term’s plain and ordinary meaning) ( n.3 (1983)).

See, e.g., State v. Korzep (Korzep I), 494 n.1, 835 n.1 (1990)

A defendant is entitled to a crime-prevention instruction if it is supported by the “slightest evidence.”

ing the subject statutes, we give every word and phrase its “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” -65, ¶ 11, STATE v RANDLES Opinion of the Court 271-72 (2003) ( ).

“We give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the [L]egislature clearly intended a different meaning.” (citation omitted).

Courts also consider “the policy behind the statute and the evil it was designed to remedy.”

We must also give effect to each word or phrase and apply the “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. *505 462, 464-65, ¶ 11 , -72 (2003) ( , ).

Comm’n of Ariz., , ( , ).

“[TJhis court must presume that the legislature expressed itself in as clear a manner as possible and that it gave words their natural and obvious meanings.” Samaritan Health Sys., , 981 P.2d at 589 ; , (When interpreting statute, “[w]e give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.”).

When interpreting a statute, we afford the words their “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.”

When construing statutes, “[w]e give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” *527