Cited by

¶ 44, (“[T]here must be evidence of flight from which can be inferred a consciousness of guilt for the crime charged.”) ( ).

“Error is harmless only if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it ‘did not contribute to or affect the verdict.’” ¶ 21, ( ).

“Two forms of impermissible prosecutorial vouching exist: (1) when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness, and (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” (citation omitted).

We give deference to the trial court's ruling because it is in the best position to evaluate “’the atmosphere of the trial, the manner in which the objectionable statements were made, and the possible effect it had on the jury and the trial.’” ( ).

Even assuming, however, that the superior court improperly admitted these statements, in light of the overwhelming evidence against Yazzie, we are confident “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”

Furthermore, in our review, we do not distinguish “between the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence.” n.1, n.1 (1993).

Sec., ¶ 22, ¶¶ 17-18, ; 858, P.2d 1152, 1191 (1993) (when objections were raised in the family court, the harmless error standard is applied).

We give deference to the trial court’s ruling because it is in the best position to evaluate “the atmosphere of the trial, the manner in which the objectionable statements were made, and the possible effect it had on the jury and the trial.”

¶ 26 “We must reverse a conviction unless we are ‘confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no influence on the jury’s judgment.’ ” Carlos, , 17 P.3d at 124

Under the circumstances presented, we cannot say that “the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” (emphasis and citation omitted).

¶33 “[D]uring closing arguments, counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”

see also Henderson, 115 P.3d at 607.

There is “no distinction between the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence.” n.1, n.1 (1993).

(holding that prosecutors “may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions”); see also United States.