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“The focus is on the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”

scientific methodology has been tested;” • whether the methodology has been “subjected to peer review;” • “the ‘known or potential rate of error;’ ” • “whether the methodology has ‘general acceptance;’ ” and • “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.” Klein, 231 Ariz. at 473, ¶ 27 , 296 P.3d at 1009 (citing Daubert for first four factors); , 586 n. 32, , 1189 n. 32 (1993) (quoting Daubert for last factor); see also Fed.R.Evid.

Although evidence of Miller’s prior felony conviction was inadmissible for purposes of Rule 404(b), Ariz. R. Evid., we have held that “[w]hen a witness unexpectedly volunteers an inadmissible statement, the action called for rests largely within the (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948)).

“Given the case-specific nature of the inquiry, however, [Dickinson] must show the error was fundamental in light of the facts *531 and circumstances of this ease, recognizing that ‘the same error may be fundamental in one case but not in another.’” James, 231 Ariz. at 493, ¶ 13, 297 P.3d at 185 ( , ).

An error is harmless if the state can establish beyond a reasonable doubt, “‘in light of all of the evidence,’” that the error did not “contribute to or affect the verdict.” Id.

(mistrial); (designation of 3 Prosecutors and courts should tread carefully in areas that may affect the fairness of a criminal trial.

-10 ¶ 68, -75 (2004) (recognizing the validity of the product rule); -83, -86 (1993) (providing an example of product rule calculation).

While bound, Jeni would have been uncertain as to her fate, and thus suffered the requisite mental anguish necessary for the “especially cruel” finding required by § 13-751(F)(6).

Given the case-specific nature of the inquiry, however, James must show the error was fundamental in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, recognizing that “the same error may be fundamental in one case but not in another.”

Dann II, 220 Ariz. at 363-64 ¶ 51, 207 P.3d at 616-17

¶ 59 , (noting that “[ejounsel can argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.”); , (recognizing that counsel may “summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”); , (stating that counsel is given “

Sec., n.9, n.9 (2004) (“‘[O]pening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an 8 appellant’s position on the issues raised.

(error in excluding evidence harmless when beyond reasonable doubt it did not affect verdict).

(“[Djuring closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”).

was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” ¶21 , ( , ).

(“We conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s decision [on a Rule 20 motion], viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.”).

2; (“[I]f, in a given case, the victim's state constitutional rights conflict with a defendant's federal constitutional rights to due process and effective cross- examination, the victim's rights must yield.”); -03, -06 (1993) (noting that victims’ rights cannot conflict with right to a fair trial).

In criminal cases, we find an error “is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” see also State v. King, 599 Ariz. Adv.