Cited by

¶12 Criminal intent is generally shown by circumstantial evidence because it reflects a defendant’s “state of mind,” ¶ 16 (2009) (), and we do not distinguish “between the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence” in ascertaining the defendant’s state of mind, n.1 (1993).

(finding error harmless where improper evidentiary ruling had no impact on the jury’s guilty verdict).

–03 (1993) (concluding that prosecutor erred by imploring the jury to protect the victim’s rights and reasoning that “[a] jury in a criminal trial is not expected to strike some sort of balance between the victim’s and the defendant’s rights,” and “[t]he statements encouraged the jury to decide the case on emotion

The prosecutor’s comments about Woods “want[ing] to make money” during the State’s opening were improper because “[o]pening statement is counsel’s opportunity to tell the jury what evidence they intend to introduce” and “not a time to argue the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn from evidence not yet admitted.”

4 STATE v. FELIX Decision of the Court conclusions.”

¶13 A flight instruction is only proper when the evidence of flight leads to an inference of “a consciousness of guilt for the crime charged.”

("Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.").

“Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”

("When an issue is raised but erroneously ruled on by the trial court, this court reviews for harmless error.").

–31 (1997) (citing Roper, 172 Ariz. at 236); ¶ 23 (2011) (directing trial courts to enforce victims’ rights unless the result would deprive the defendant of a fair trial); –03 (1993) (“It cannot be doubted that victims of crime, and their families, have certain rights.

see also Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

“[D]uring closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”

“[D]uring closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”

However, “temporal remoteness goes to weight, not 3 STATE v. JACKSON Decision of the Court admissibility.” ¶ 24 (1999).

Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, n.1 (1993), and wholly circumstantial evidence can support differing, yet reasonable inferences, State v. Anaya, 3 STATE v. KINGSTON Decision of the Court see also State v. Olivas, 119