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¶13 “Opening statement is not a time to argue the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn from evidence not yet admitted.”

But even assuming the evidence was irrelevant, its admission was harmless error because “the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).

“[D]uring closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.” Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 466 ¶ 196 ().

¶7 The Rules have been interpreted as allowing a challenge for cause during trial, “provided the grounds for the challenge were not known earlier,” and “where there are sufficient jurors to enable the trial to continue,” 2 But Sernas did not raise his challenge until after the 1Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise ind

See, (trial judge has discretion to limit “repetitive, irrelevant, or argumentative questioning”); Ariz. R. Evid.

“[D]uring closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable 4 STATE v. WYLIE Decision of the Court inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”

To find harmless error, we must be persuaded that the State has met its burden of establishing, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” ¶ 39 (2008) ().

An error is harmless “if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” ¶ 19 (App. 2014) ().

n.1 (1993), 5 STATE v. PRADO Decision of the Court abrogation on other grounds recognized by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 815 (9th Cir. 2015).

endant was not prejudiced “in any way,” Roberts, 126 Ariz. at 94, we must consider whether “we can say, beyond a reasonable 6 STATE v. GRIER Decision of the Court doubt,” that the superior court’s erroneous failure to exclude witnesses “did not contribute to or affect the verdict,”

(“Absent fundamental error, a party usually cannot raise error on appeal unless a proper objection was made at trial.”); ¶ 101, n.9 (2004) (“Failure to argue a claim [on appeal] usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.” (quoting State v. Carver, 160 Ariz

(stating that error is harmless if the reviewing court can determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it neither affected nor contributed to the verdict).

We review a trial court’s decision on a Rule 20 motion de novo, “viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.”

We review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a criminal conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict

(“Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”).

(“We conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s decision, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.”) (citation omitted).

(an error is harmless "if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.").

violation of a prophylactic rule” and, therefore, “not the rare case that involves fundamental error.” To meet his burden at this stage, Mendoza must show the error “was fundamental in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, recognizing that ‘the same error may be fundamental in one case but not in another.’” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) ().

or court’s denial of a mistrial “because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate ‘the atmosphere of the trial, the manner in which the 3 STATE v. GRAY Decision of the Court objectionable statement was made, and the possible effect it had on the jury and the trial.’” ().

¶5 Prosecutors are given “wide latitude” in presenting closing argument to the jury and “may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.” Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 466, ¶ 196 ().