Cited by

(“[D]uring closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”); Hunter, 136 Ariz. at 50 (“[T]he fact that the defendant had some motive, good or bad, for committing the crime is

(limiting closing argument to the evidence presented at trial); (“The trial court’s consideration 8 STATE V. JOHNSON Opinion of the Court of other similarly situat

And while the court noted that Champagne may understandably be upset and have “some trust issues” if counsel truly fell asleep during a brief period of his prior trial, “[a] mere allegation of lost confidence in counsel does not require appointing substitute counsel.”

“Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”

at 186-87, ¶ 29 (-47 (1997))

(“Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”).

¶14 In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, our “focus is on the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” (citations omitted), possible abrogation in part recognized by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 815-18 (9th Cir. 2015).

Parker, 231 Ariz. at 403, ¶ 44; ("[T]here must be evidence of flight from which can be inferred a consciousness of guilt for the crime charged.").

5 STATE v. BROWN Decision of the Court ¶19 In reviewing whether sufficient evidence exists, we consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16, recognizing that a conviction may rest solely on circumstantial evidence, n.1 (1993); ¶ 16 (2009) (“Criminal intent, being a state of mind, is shown by circumstantial evidence.” ()).

was surely unattributable to the error.” ¶ 21 (2001) ().

¶27 In reviewing whether sufficient evidence exists, we consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16, recognizing that a conviction may rest solely on circumstantial evidence, n.1 (1993).

on for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, bearing in mind “the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate ‘the atmosphere of the trial, the manner in which the objectionable statement was made, and the possible effect it had on the jury and the trial.’” ¶ 18 (2010) ( ¶ 52 (2000), ).

State v. Bible , , 588, , 1191 (1993).

so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant,’” ¶ 119 (2018) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding.”); (recognizing that the touchstone of our analysis is trial fairness).

In reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, our “focus is on the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”

¶ 21 (2001) (“Error is harmless only if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it ‘did not contribute to or affect the verdict.’”) ().

See State v. Bible , , 568, , 1171 (1993) (noting that when "[t]he record does not show" a fact, "we will not speculate" about it).

Nor is the defendant “entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.” ¶ 11 (1998) ().

Rather than performing a “mechanical count of the similarities,” the superior court is directed to ask whether the acts are “so similar, unusual, and distinctive” that it “could reasonably find that they bear the same signature.”

On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence, Salman, 182 Ariz. at 361, and make no distinction between the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence, n.1 (1993).

(finding that prosecutor’s references to “defendant’s failure to call an expert witness” were appropriate responses to defendant’s arguments); (“[D]uring closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”); (finding that prosecutor’s argument that a defendant had the op