Cited by

-11 (1995) (advisory counsel and expert witnesses); (investigators).

¶18 Under the plain view doctrine, while officers are executing a search warrant, and “[a]s long as the warrant authorized them to be where they were, the police could seize any items that were in plain view, the evidentiary value of which was immediately apparent.”

See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (“The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (noting that this limitation applies to pretrial detainees as well as convicted prisoners); (holding defendant has no expectation of privacy in non-legal letters and notes seized from jail cell).

-64 (1993) (stating that although the defendant, who stayed at the victim’s apartment, had a privacy interest in the apartment as a whole, he had no standing to challenge the search of a third party’s bag and camera inside the apartment); see also United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1169-70 (9th Cir.

See Horton, 496 U.S. at 142 (noting that police had probable cause to believe objects seized were incriminating evidence); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326–27 (recognizing plain view doctrine can apply when officer has probable cause to believe object is contraband); Brown, 460 U.S. at 741–42; (noting that plain view doctrine justified seizure if apparent evidentiary value of items established probable cause).

(requiring showing of actual prejudice to reverse on basis that jurors were inadvertently exposed outside of courtroom to handcuffed or shackled defendant).

Brown did not request that the trial court ask the jurors if they were in fact aware of the restraints, nor did he seek “to make an evidentiary record after trial.” (defendant could have, but did not, request post-trial voir dire of jury to identify any prejudice resulting from exposure to defendant in handcuffs or shackles).

(affirming denial of new trial where four jurors saw defendant in shackles and handcuffs being escorted from courthouse).

A juror’s inadvertent exposure to the defendant in handcuffs outside the courtroom, however, “is not inherently prejudicial, and a defendant is not entitled to a new trial absent a showing of actual prejudice.” Speer, 221 Ariz. at 462-63 ¶¶ 74-75, 212 P.3d at 800-01 (internal quotation marks omitted) (one juror); (several jurors).

4 ¶7 which held that a defendant has no constitutional right to ex parte proceedings and noted that the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure require a defendant to disclose all witnesses and defenses.

Defendant has not cited, nor has our research revealed, any authority *272 suggesting that Rule 15.9(b) was intended to tramp a victim’s right to be present at “all criminal proceedings.” ¶ 8

¶74 On the other hand, “the inadvertent exposure of a handcuffed or shackled defendant to members of the jury outside the courtroom is not inherently prejudicial, and a defendant is not entitled to a new trial absent a showing of actual prejudice.” (noting that when “several jurors inadvertently saw the defendant in custody while on the way to the courtroom” the relevant question was “whether the defendant was prejudice

¶¶ 27-28, (legal question whether Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applies to specific facts of case reviewed de novo); (due process claims reviewed de novo); (“We agree with the trial court that the identification in this case does not come within the ambit of Dessureault.”).

1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); United States v. Brown, 878 F.2d 222, 225 (8th Cir.1989); see also Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir.1977) (“jail officials may read outgoing nonprivileged mail”); , (Fourth Anendment did not apply to letters seized from jail cell); People v. Phillips, 219 Mich.App.

1 Between August and October of 1988, “the brothers met and ‘conned’ a series of women” to obtain “money and other assistance.”

¶ 38 Rarely have both (F)(4) and (F)(5) been found in the same case, but we did find both factors in State v. (Michael) Apelt

See, e.g., Willoughby, P.2d 1319; P.2d 634 (1993).

State v. (Michael) Apelt

¶ 16 Before evidence may be considered newly discovered, it “must appear on its face to have existed at the time of trial but be discovered after trial.”