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A defendant is not prejudiced when introduction of the joined evidence would be permitted “for an evidentiary purpose anyway.” (quoting Morris K. Udall et al., Arizona Practice— Law of Evidence § 84, at 184 n.14 (3d ed. 1991)).

(holding that any error in witness’s testimony was invited because of the “broad question posed to him” by defense counsel).

(considering the acquittal of the defendant on some counts as evidence that “the jury followed the judge’s instructions and considered the evidence separately on each charge”).

To the contrary, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated the same under Arizona law, and a conspiracy may consist of, and be proven by, circumstantial evidence alone, (“Criminal conspiracy need not be, and usually cannot be, proved by direct evidence.”).

If anything, the record reflects that the jury followed the court’s instructions and carefully considered the charges and evidence because the jury acquitted McKinney on four charges.1 (finding the jury’s decision to acquit the defendant on some charges evidenced that the jury followed the court’s precautionary instruction).

(“Arizona law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.”).

Indeed, the not-guilty verdicts on Counts 43, 66, 67, and 97 demonstrate that the jurors carefully considered the evidence and disproves Gehon’s contention that the jury simply convicted him out of “anger.” (rejecting the defendant’s claim that evidence of other acts caused him unfair prejudice, noting the jury’s acquittals on some counts showed that the 8 The court admitted evidence of prior sexual assaults under both Rule 404(b) and Rule 404(c) and gave corresponding final jury instructions.

Additionally, the invited error doctrine “prevents a defendant from introducing forbidden evidence and then seeking reversal based on its erroneous introduction.”

“The identity exception to [Rule] 404(b) applies if identity is in issue, and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

(“Arizona law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.”).

STATE v. BUTLER Decision of the Court 881, 892 (1993) (reasoning that the defendant failed to prove prejudice because the jury based their verdicts on the evidence when the jury acquitted the defendant o

404(b) applies if identity is in issue, ‘and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.’” (citation omitted).

¶10 Evidence is admissible to prove identity under Rule 404(b) if the behavior of the accused on different occasions is “so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” (citation omitted).

[are] so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 5 STATE V. BURUATO Decision of the Court (“[T]he modus operandi

a motion for mistrial after inadmissible testimony is unexpectedly interjected, the trial court should consider “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.”