Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Stuard, 863 P.2d 881.

166 citing documents.

State v. Prince 250 P.3d 1145 Ariz. 2011
State v. Prince 250 P.3d 1145 Ariz. 2011
most, Prince proved that he has a personality disorder, not that “the disorder controlled [his] conduct.” -06, -03 (1992) (concluding “[d]efendant’s borderline personality disorder [did] not warrant a reduction of his sentence to life imprisonment”); (“Even if [the defendant] became enraged when confronted by his victims, he still displayed some ability to control his actions .
State v. Fischer 199 P.3d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Fischer 199 P.3d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
While the evidence supporting this finding is admittedly circumstantial, “Arizona law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.”
State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
Prejudice from a failure to sever is unlikely “[i]f the evidence of one crime would have been admissible in a separate trial for the others.”
State v. Williams 99 P.3d 43 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Williams 99 P.3d 43 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
404(b) applies if identity is in issue, ‘and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.’ ” , (citing Morris K. Udall et al., Arizona Practice— Law of Evidence § 84, at 183-84 (3d ed.1991)).
State v. Aguilar 97 P.3d 865 Ariz. 2004
Explained State v. Aguilar 97 P.3d 865 Ariz. 2004
(finding that evidence of a previous assault was admissible to show motive and intent for subsequent murder); -600, -92 As explained in ¶ 20, in 1997 this court adopted Rule 404(c).
State v. Prion 52 P.3d 189 Ariz. 2002
State v. Prion 52 P.3d 189 Ariz. 2002
are so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” (citations omitted); Except as provided in Rule 404(c) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
State of Arizona v. Marcos Antonio Herrera Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State of Arizona v. Marcos Antonio Herrera Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
In carrying out this responsibility, “we are sometimes called upon to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment even in cases where the facts are aggravated and the tragedy immense.”
State v. Sierra-Cervantes 37 P.3d 432 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Sierra-Cervantes 37 P.3d 432 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
¶ 15 Fundamental error is error “ ‘going to the foundation of the case or that which takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense.’ ” , ( , ).
State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
“[E]videnee of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a significant mitigating factor.” , 608 n. 12, , 900 n. 12 (1993).
State v. Jones 4 P.3d 345 Ariz. 2000
State v. Jones 4 P.3d 345 Ariz. 2000
State v. Martinez 999 P.2d 795 Ariz. 2000
State v. Martinez 999 P.2d 795 Ariz. 2000
1439 , 146 L.Ed.2d 327 (2000); , 608 n. 12, , 900 n. 12 (1993) (“[E]vidence of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a significant mitigating factor.”).
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Clabourne 983 P.2d 748 Ariz. 1999
State v. Clabourne 983 P.2d 748 Ariz. 1999
” , (when voices told defendant to kill he could not control what he was doing) (emphasis added); , 608 n. 12, , 892 n. 12 (1993) (“[E]videnee of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a significant mitigating factor.”)
State v. Tankersley 956 P.2d 486 Ariz. 1998
State v. Tankersley 956 P.2d 486 Ariz. 1998
-98 , -90 (1993) (examining differences as well as similarities among the crimes).
State v. Garland 953 P.2d 1266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Garland 953 P.2d 1266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
¶ 22 The identity exception to Rule 404 only applies if the “ ‘pattern and characteristics of the crimes [are] so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.’ ” , (citing Morris K. Udall et al., Law of Evidence § 84, at 185 (3d ed.1991))(emphasis added); , cert.
State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1204 Ariz. 1997
State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1204 Ariz. 1997
109 , 769 (1996) (-97 , -89 (1993)).
State v. McCrimmon 927 P.2d 1298 Ariz. 1996
State v. McCrimmon 927 P.2d 1298 Ariz. 1996
2535 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1996)
State v. Ives 927 P.2d 762 Ariz. 1996
State v. Ives 927 P.2d 762 Ariz. 1996
However, even if defendant is entitled to severance as a matter of right, the denial of severance is reversible error only if the evidence of other crimes would not have been admitted at trial “for an evidentiary purpose anyway.” -97 , -89 (1993) (quoting Morris K. Udall, et al., Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 84, at 184 n. 14 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter “Arizona Evidence”]); , (Defendant is not entitled to a trial separate from his co-defendant
State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
608 n. 12, , 900 n. 12 (1993) (“[E]vidence of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a significant mitigating factor.”).
State v. Medrano 914 P.2d 225 Ariz. 1996
State v. Medrano 914 P.2d 225 Ariz. 1996
608 & n. 12, , 900 & n. 12 (1993).
State v. Spears 908 P.2d 1062 Ariz. 1996
State v. Spears 908 P.2d 1062 Ariz. 1996
State v. Murray 906 P.2d 542 Ariz. 1995
State v. Murray 906 P.2d 542 Ariz. 1995
State v. Grannis 900 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1995