Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Taylor, 821 P.2d 166.

49 citing documents.

State v. Mahoney in and for County of Maricopa 442 P.3d 374 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Co. , , "[w]ith certain exceptions ...
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano 375 P.3d 69 Ariz. 2016
Co., 511, 172 (1991) (holding that “[w]hen an employer negligently contributes to an employee’s injury, the joint tortfeasors may require the employer’s negligence to be considered for the assessment of fault under A.R.S.
Jeanette M. Sanders v. Francis Alger 375 P.3d 1199 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Co., (jury finding of nonparty at fault “does not subject the nonparty to liability”).
Keenan Reed-Kaliher v. Hon. hoggat/state 347 P.3d 136 Ariz. 2015
Co., (noting that when “more than one interpretation [of a statute] is plausible, we ordinarily interpret the statute in such a way as to achieve the general legislative goals that can be adduced from the body of legislation in question”).
John Munic Enterprises, Inc. v. Laos 326 P.3d 279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Co., (first emphasis added; second 4 JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS Opinion of the Court emphasis in Dietz).
Loftus v. Arizona State University Public Safety Personnel Retirement System Local Board 255 P.3d 1020 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Co., , (when statute susceptible to more than one construction and legislative intent unascertainable, “we ordinarily interpret the statute in such a way as to achieve the general legislative goals that can be adduced from the body of legislation”).
Young v. Beck 251 P.3d 380 Ariz. 2011
Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, ).
State Farm Insurance Companies v. Premier Manufactured Systems, Inc. 172 P.3d 410 Ariz. 2007
Acuna v. Hampton And Kroack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, see also Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp., 194 Ariz. 142, ¶ 5, (under UCATA, “‘each tortfeasor in a personal injury action is liable only for his or her share of fault’”)
Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo 79 P.3d 1206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Co., , , 603 n. 9, , 823 n. 9 (1990).
In Re Leon G. 59 P.3d 779 Ariz. 2002
Co., , (explaining that when the meaning of a statutory term is not clear, we look to the overall language of the statute for assistance).
West v. State 58 P.3d 28 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
Co., , (emphasis omitted).
In Re the Detention of Wilber W. 53 P.3d 1145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Co., , (when the meaning of a statutory term is not clear, we look to the overall language of the statute for assistance).
Weber v. Tucson Electric Power Co. 47 P.3d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
But, with the abrogation of joint and several liability and the corresponding ability *506 of a third-party tortfeasor to name an employer as a nonparty at fault, , the court concluded that the appropriate interpretation of the lien statute required achieving “a reasonable balance between the rights of employer and employee, consistent with the underlying goals of the compensation scheme.” Aitken, 183 Ariz. at 392 , 904 P.2d at 461 .
Gunnell v. Arizona Public Service Co. 46 P.3d 399 Ariz. 2002
Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, ).
State v. Ehrlich 26 P.3d 481 Ariz. 2001
Co., , (when the meaning of a statutory term is not clear, we look to the overall language of the statute for assistance).
In Re Leon G. 26 P.3d 481 Ariz. 2001
Co., , (when the meaning of a statutory term is not clear, we look to the overall language of the statute for assistance).
Fehribach v. Smith 22 P.3d 508 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Co., (the underlying public policy of these statutes is to make each person “responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault and no more "j. 1 *73 ¶ 14 To explain why a complete shield to owner liability in present circumstances would clash with fundamental principles of comparative fault and comparative
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix 4 P.3d 413 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Co., -10 , -71 (1991) (adoption of comparative fault and contribution among tortfeasors, with abrogation of joint liability, established system “making each tortfeasor responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault, and no more”)); see also Hutcherson, 192 Ariz. at 55, ¶21 , 961 P.2d at 453 (jury appropriately allocat
Lowry v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 989 P.2d 152 Ariz. 1999
Frederikson v. Maricopa County 3 P.3d 1024 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Duarte v. State 971 P.2d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Co., , (defendants may constitutionally name immune employer as non-party at fault in negligence action even though apportionment of fault may effectively reduce plaintiffs recovery from other defendants).
Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. 978 P.2d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Co., , (joint tortfeasor may require employer’s negligence to be considered for assessment of fault under A.R.S.
Piner v. Superior Court in and for County of Maricopa 962 P.2d 909 Ariz. 1998
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix 961 P.2d 449 Ariz. 1998
Co., , (discussing the legislative history of UCATA and the right of contribution under the new statutory scheme).
Oaks v. McQuiller 955 P.2d 971 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Zuern v. Ford Motor Co. 937 P.2d 676 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Co., , and that designating a nonparty at fault allows defendants “to offer trial evidence of [the nonparty’s] negligence and to argue that the jury should attribute all or some percentage of fault to [the non-party], thereby reducing Defendants’ pereentage of fault and consequent liability.” Id.
Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co. 936 P.2d 1274 Ariz. 1997
Co., , (nonemployer defendants allegedly contributing to plaintiffs work-related injuries permitted to name plaintiffs employer as nonparty at fault in personal injury action).
Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse 945 P.2d 317 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Rosner v. Denim & Diamonds, Inc. 937 P.2d 353 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Co., , 510, , 171 (1991) (emphasis in original).
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix 933 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Thomas v. First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. 930 P.2d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Co., , the supreme court acknowledged that the legislature specifically enacted § 12-2506 to establish “a system of several liability making each tortfeasor responsible for paying for his or her percentage of fault and no more.” (Emphasis in original).
Zamora v. Reinstein 915 P.2d 1227 Ariz. 1996
We also interpret statutes “in such a way as to achieve the general legislative goals that can be adduced from the body of legislation in question.”
Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 904 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1995
Aitken v. Industrial Commission 904 P.2d 456 Ariz. 1995
Co., , we held that under A.R.S.
Natseway v. City of Tempe 909 P.2d 441 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
PAM TRANSPORT v. Freightliner Corp. 893 P.2d 1295 Ariz. 1995
Co., , , 240 n. 2, , 378 n. 2 (1990).
Wareing v. Falk 897 P.2d 1381 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Cella Barr Associates, Inc. v. Cohen 868 P.2d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Estate of Hernandez v. Bd. of Regents 866 P.2d 1330 Ariz. 1994
Co., , 510, , 171 (1991); -76 , -28 (CtApp.
Neil v. Kavena 859 P.2d 203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
John Deere Insurance v. West American Insurance Group 854 P.2d 1201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Co., , (“when the text of a statute is capable of more than one construction or result, legislative intent on the specific issue is unas-certainable, and more than one interpretation is plausible, we ordinarily interpret the statute in such a way as to achieve the general legislative goals that can be adduced fro
Wiley v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 847 P.2d 595 Ariz. 1993
Aitken v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 842 P.2d 1313 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
Ocotillo West Joint Venture v. Superior Court 844 P.2d 653 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co. 842 P.2d 1355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
is particularly pertinent in this respect.
Consolidated Enterprises, Inc. v. Schwindt 833 P.2d 706 Ariz. 1992
Co., , (court not free to decide case on common law or equitable basis given statutory mandate).
Shelby v. Action Scaffolding, Inc. 827 P.2d 462 Ariz. 1992
Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc. 825 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1992