Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217.

79 citing documents.

State v. Pry 562 P.3d 885 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State of Arizona v. Oscar Pena Trujillo 462 P.3d 550 Ariz. 2020
State v. Healer 440 P.3d 404 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2019
State v. Healer 440 P.3d 404 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2019
State v. Noble , , 174, , 1220 (1992) (quoting Calder v. Bull , 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
State v. Morgan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Trujillo 430 P.3d 379 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
State v. Trujillo 430 P.3d 379 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
It compared State v. Noble , , upon which the state relied, with Fushek v. State , , upon which Trujillo relied.
State of Arizona v. Jason Eugene Bush 423 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2018
State of Arizona v. Jason Eugene Bush 423 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2018
State v. Noble , , 173, , 1219 (1992).
State of Arizona v. Lynn Lavern Burbey Ariz. 2017
State of Arizona v. Craig Victor Coleman 385 P.3d 420 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
State of Arizona v. Craig Victor Coleman 385 P.3d 420 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
(§ 13-3821 rationally related to aiding law 6 STATE v. COLEMAN Opinion of the Court enforcement’s investigative work); see also Lowery, 287 P.3d at 542 (§ 13-3821 rationally related to legitimate s
State of Arizona v. Lynn Lavern Burbey 381 P.3d 290 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
As our supreme court has observed, the legislature’s “overriding purpose” in enacting Arizona’s sex offender registration statutes is to “facilitat[e] the location of child sex offenders by law enforcement personnel.” 3The seventy-two hour grace period excludes weekends and legal holidays.
Musselman v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Cortes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Cortes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
§ 13-907, the term generally means a “legal incapacity or disqualification,” see Zaputil, 220 Ariz. at 428, ¶ 12, 207 P.3d at 681 (citation omitted), and the registration requirement itself does not result in any legal incapacity or disqualification because it “does not affirmatively inhibit or restrain an offender’s movements or activities.” -77, -23 (1992) (holding that sex-offender registration is regulatory, rather than punitive for purposes of ex post facto analysis).
State of Arizona v. Stephen Vincent Haverstick 318 P.3d 877 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Stephen Vincent Haverstick 318 P.3d 877 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
For purposes of this case, a law violates the ex post facto clauses of the state or federal constitutions if it “‘changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.’” quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
State of Arizona v. Raymond John 308 P.3d 1208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Raymond John 308 P.3d 1208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
(“Arizona’s sex offender registration statute .
State v. Stocks 258 P.3d 208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Stocks 258 P.3d 208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
-12, ¶ 26-27, -96, 302 (2000) ( , ).
State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10, Clause 1, Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 25
State v. Cropper 225 P.3d 579 Ariz. 2010
State v. Cropper 225 P.3d 579 Ariz. 2010
e provisions “prohibit[] a state from ‘retroactively alter[ing] the 4 definition of crimes or increas[ing] the punishment for criminal acts.’” State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 16, (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)); -74, -20 (1992).
State v. Henry 228 P.3d 900 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State v. Henry 228 P.3d 900 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State v. Patterson 218 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Patterson 218 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Fushek v. State 183 P.3d 536 Ariz. 2008
Fushek v. State 183 P.3d 536 Ariz. 2008
We assume for the purposes of this case that these statutes apply retroactively, and therefore cite to the current versions.
State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
(“[A] primary purpose of the ex post facto clause [is] ‘to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’”), quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964 (1981)
State v. Gum 153 P.3d 418 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Gum 153 P.3d 418 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
In Shane B., the court noted that (as in this case): Retroactive application of the statute in the instant case does not “change[] the punishment, [or] inflict [a] greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” , *404 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
State v. Long 83 P.3d 618 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Long 83 P.3d 618 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Davis 79 P.3d 64 Ariz. 2003
State v. Davis 79 P.3d 64 Ariz. 2003
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Rayes 75 P.3d 148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Rayes 75 P.3d 148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
-46, ¶ 16 , -27 (2003); , 173 n. 4, , 1219 n. 4 (1992) (“[T]he analysis under both constitutions is the same[.]”).
State v. Casey 71 P.3d 351 Ariz. 2003
State v. Casey 71 P.3d 351 Ariz. 2003
Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271; (identical federal and state constitutional clauses interpreted similarly).
State v. Ring 65 P.3d 915 Ariz. 2003
State v. Griffin 58 P.3d 516 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Griffin 58 P.3d 516 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
¶ 14 Moreover, the ex post facto prohibition is primarily concerned with whether such retroactive application “ ‘makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal,’ ” or “ ‘changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.’” , quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
State v. Helmer 53 P.3d 1153 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Helmer 53 P.3d 1153 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Zuther v. State 14 P.3d 295 Ariz. 2000