Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217.

79 citing documents.

Zuther v. State 14 P.3d 295 Ariz. 2000
If on the other hand, the legislature indicated a non-punitive purpose, we must ‘inquire further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.’ ” , (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 , 100 S.Ct.
In Re Shane B. 7 P.3d 94 Ariz. 2000
In Re Shane B. 7 P.3d 94 Ariz. 2000
Retroactive application of the statute in the instant case does not “change[ ] the punishment, [or] inflict [a] greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” , (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
Martin v. Reinstein 987 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Martin v. Reinstein 987 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
2072 ; , Arizona Dep’t of Pub.
In Re Shane B. 979 P.2d 1014 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
In Re Shane B. 979 P.2d 1014 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Retroactive application of a criminal statute violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions if it “ ‘changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed .’ ” , (quoting Colder v. Bull, 3 U.S.(3 DalL.)
Arizona Department of Public Safety v. Superior Court 949 P.2d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Arizona Department of Public Safety v. Superior Court 949 P.2d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
the Arizona Supreme Court considered an ex post facto challenge to the application of the registration statute to persons who had committed qualifying offenses prior to the statute’s effective date.
Baker v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR MARICOPA CTY. 947 P.2d 910 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
174, , 1220 (1992) (indicating that a state may not enact a law that changes the punishment and imposes a greater punishment than that attached to the crime when committed); Saucedo v. Superior Court (Buckelew), 1 CA-SA 97-0088 (App. Sept.
Saucedo v. Superior Court 946 P.2d 908 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Saucedo v. Superior Court 946 P.2d 908 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
A state may enact no law “that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” , (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
State v. Olvera 952 P.2d 313 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
State v. Olvera 952 P.2d 313 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
(Arizona sex offender registration statute found to be part of a regulatory scheme to effect a legitimate public purpose and, therefore, despite some punitive effect, did not violate the ex post facto clauses of either the United States or Arizona Constitutions).
In Re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-132744 933 P.2d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
In Re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-132744 933 P.2d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that retroactive application of the sex offender registration requirement was regulatory rather than punitive and therefore not violative of any constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws.
In re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-512016 923 P.2d 880 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
In re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-512016 923 P.2d 880 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Retroactive application of a sentencing or dispositional statute violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions only if it “inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” , (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.)
In Re the Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Delinquency Action No. JV95000239 921 P.2d 34 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
In Re the Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Delinquency Action No. JV95000239 921 P.2d 34 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 *236 (1990)
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action Nos. JV-512600 and JV-512797 930 P.2d 496 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action Nos. JV-512600 and JV-512797 930 P.2d 496 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
“We ordinarily interpret the scope of a clause in the Arizona Constitution similarly to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of an identical clause in the federal constitution.”
State v. Cameron 916 P.2d 1183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Cameron 916 P.2d 1183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Williams 898 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
vacated in part on other grounds, , in dealing with multiple sexual assaults, each of a different type, the court stated, “[i]f the state can prove the necessary criminal elements of each act, the time span within which the acts were committed is immaterial.” Because the court in McCuin was not dealing with multiple acts of the same type, the ca
State v. Manning 532 N.W.2d 244 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
State v. Andersen 868 P.2d 964 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
vacated in part on other grounds, , (“The need to protect potential victims also is an appropriate factor to consider in deciding the length of sentence to impose.”); , (protecting society from defendant’s gross disregard for legal system is proper aggravating factor).
State v. Boldrey 861 P.2d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
Phillips, , , vacated in part on other grounds
State v. McCuin 829 P.2d 1217 Ariz. 1992