Cited by

Because the language of both the Arizona and federal provisions is materially the same, we generally interpret them as having the same scope, and Arizona courts have “consistently followed federal precedent in this area.”

In determining whether a statute is civil or criminal, courts generally apply the “intent/effects test.” See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (applying the intent/effects test to determine whether Alaska’s sex offender registration statutes were civil or criminal); (stating this court looks first to the intent/effects test to determine whether “the registration requirement is punitive or regulatory”).

State v. Noble , , 174, , 1220 (1992) (quoting Calder v. Bull , 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)

see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2003) (finding Alaska’s sex offender registration laws did not constitute ex post facto punishment because the intent of Alaska’s legislature was to create a nonpunitive regime).

It compared State v. Noble , , upon which the state relied, with Fushek v. State , , upon which Trujillo relied.

State v. Noble , , 173, , 1219 (1992).

¶14 The court of appeals also grounded its interpretation in the sex offender registration statute’s “overriding purpose,” which is “to ‘facilitat[e] the location of child sex offenders by law enforcement personnel.’” Burbey, 240 Ariz. at 500 ¶ 10 () (alteration in original).

(§ 13-3821 rationally related to aiding law 6 STATE v. COLEMAN Opinion of the Court enforcement’s investigative work); see also Lowery, 287 P.3d at 542 (§ 13-3821 rationally rel

As our supreme court has observed, the legislature’s “overriding purpose” in enacting Arizona’s sex offender registration statutes is to “facilitat[e] the location of child sex offenders by law enforcement personnel.” 3The seventy-two hour grace period excludes weekends and legal holidays.

§ 13-907, the term generally means a “legal incapacity or disqualification,” see Zaputil, 220 Ariz. at 428, ¶ 12, 207 P.3d at 681 (citation omitted), and the registration requirement itself does not result in any legal incapacity or disqualification because it “does not affirmatively inhibit or restrain an offender’s movements or activities.” -77, -23 (1992) (holding that sex-offender registration is regulatory, rather than punitive for purposes of ex post facto analysis).

For purposes of this case, a law violates the ex post facto clauses of the state or federal constitutions if it “‘changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.’” quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).

-12, ¶ 26-27, -96, 302 (2000) ( , ).

U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10, Clause 1, Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 25

Those provisions “prohibit[] a state from ‘retroactively alter[ing] the 4 definition of crimes or increas[ing] the punishment for criminal acts.’” State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 16, (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)); -74, -20 (1992).

We assume for the purposes of this case that these statutes apply retroactively, and therefore cite to the current versions.

(“[A] primary purpose of the ex post facto clause [is] ‘to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’”), quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964 (1981); State v.

In Shane B., the court noted that (as in this case): Retroactive application of the statute in the instant case does not “change[] the punishment, [or] inflict [a] greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” , *404 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)

-46, ¶ 16 , -27 (2003); , 173 n. 4, , 1219 n. 4 (1992) (“[T]he analysis under both constitutions is the same[.]”).

Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271; (identical federal and state constitutional clauses interpreted similarly).

¶ 14 Moreover, the ex post facto prohibition is primarily concerned with whether such retroactive application “ ‘makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal,’ ” or “ ‘changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.’” , quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)

If on the other hand, the legislature indicated a non-punitive purpose, we must ‘inquire further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.’ ” , (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 , 100 S.Ct.

Retroactive application of the statute in the instant case does not “change[ ] the punishment, [or] inflict [a] greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” , (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)

2072 ; , Arizona Dep’t of Pub.

Retroactive application of a criminal statute violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions if it “ ‘changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed .’ ” , (quoting Colder v. Bull, 3 U.S.(3 DalL.)

the Arizona Supreme Court considered an ex post facto challenge to the application of the registration statute to persons who had committed qualifying offenses prior to the statute’s effective date.

174, , 1220 (1992) (indicating that a state may not enact a law that changes the punishment and imposes a greater punishment than that attached to the crime when committed); Saucedo v. Superior Court (Buckelew), 1 CA-SA 97-0088 (App. Sept.

A state may enact no law “that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” , (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)

(Arizona sex offender registration statute found to be part of a regulatory scheme to effect a legitimate public purpose and, therefore, despite some punitive effect, did not violate the ex post facto clauses of either the United States or Arizona Constitutions).

the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that retroactive application of the sex offender registration requirement was regulatory rather than punitive and therefore not violative of any constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws.

Retroactive application of a sentencing or dispositional statute violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions only if it “inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” , (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.)

2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 *236 (1990)

“We ordinarily interpret the scope of a clause in the Arizona Constitution similarly to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of an identical clause in the federal constitution.”

vacated in part on other grounds, , in dealing with multiple sexual assaults, each of a different type, the court stated, “[i]f the state can prove the necessary criminal elements of each act, the time span within which the acts were committed is immaterial.” Because the court in McCuin was not dealing with multiple acts of the s

vacated in part on other grounds, , (“The need to protect potential victims also is an appropriate factor to consider in deciding the length of sentence to impose.”); , (protecting society from defendant’s gross disregard for legal system is proper aggravating fa

Phillips, , , vacated in part on other grounds

The disposition of McCuin’s case is contained in a separate opinion at