Cited by

VI, XIV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24

The remark Terry objected to “was but one moment in an extended trial,” id.; the singular utterance of the word “predator” did not permeate the entire trial to the 4 STATE v. TERRY Decision of the Court extent that Terry was stripped of due process, see Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 307; (“This was not a close case in which the improper questions might have tipped the scales and deprived Defendant of a fair trial.

The superior court has broad discretion in managing the conduct of a trial, and the record does not reflect that the court precluded any specific line of questioning or actually reached its final decision without considering all of the evidence ultimately offered.

Moreover, this Court has “repeatedly held that a prosecutor must not make prejudicial insinuations without being prepared to prove them.” n.10 (1994) (finding that the prosecutor’s insinuation that defense counsel coached the Defendant’s testimony was misconduct).

citing Fritz v. Spalding , 682 F.2d 782 , 784 (9th Cir. 1982) ; see also State v. Cornell , , 326, , 1364 (1994) ("[I]t is uniformly held that all motions [for self-representation] made after jury selection has begun are untimely...."); Barnes v. State , 258 Ark.

(“[A] defendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules as an attorney.” (citations omitted)).

(“[A] defendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules as an attorney.”).

In keeping with the trial court’s “broad discretion” in managing trial conduct, , this court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling regarding the use of a facility dog absent an abuse of discretion, see State v. Dye, 178 Wash.2d 541 , ¶¶ 14-15, 19, 32 (2013) (en banc) (ruling allowing facility dog to accompany witness reviewed for abuse of discreti

–23, –61 (1994) (requiring a hearing when there is a “good faith doubt about the defendant’s ability .

¶30 P.2d 1352 (1994), also does not help Gunches.

(stating that the Arizona Constitution “vest[s] in a defendant the ‘explicit’ right to defend himself”).

(recognizing that, at the trial level, once defendant has invoked right to counsel, the trial court has discretion to deny a request to “switch back” to self-representation).

¶21 “The law guarantees a defendant the right to waive counsel if he is mentally competent to do so.” (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)).

-45 , -42 (1967) (constitution “vest [s] in a defendant the ‘explicit’ right to defend himself’).

to participate intelligently in the proceedings.” -23, -61 (1994) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding competency hearing required if the evidence “raises a bona fide doubt about the defendant’s competence to stand trial”).

He relies on State v. Cornell, in which the record did not contain “all of the mitigating evidence and - 34 - circumstances that a reasonable investigation and preparation might have enabled counsel to present to the court and that might properly have been part of the record.” -36, -74 (1994).

See State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 323-24, -62 (1994).

by the trial judge should not obtain here.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8; see also State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 326, (recognizing that self-representation is not an absolute right and stating that “the court need not stop the trial for the convenience of the defendant each time he changes his mind”).

While a trial court must warn a defendant who seeks to represent himself of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, “it is not reversible error to fail to warn of every possible strategic consideration.”