Cited by

22 STATE OF ARIZONA V. EDWARD LITTLETON MCCAULEY Opinion of the Court feign [a] symptom of temporal lobe epilepsy.” –31 (1994).

(”[A] defendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules as an attorney.”); see also State v. McFarland No. 1 CA-CR 24-0585 PRPC, 2025 WL 1189807 at *1, ¶¶ 3-4 (Ariz. App. Apr.

tive pro se litigant must understand (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, and (3) the possible punishment upon conviction.” State v. 4 ¶ 24 (2009) (-24 (1994)).

¶39 Lujan acknowledges, but attempts to distinguish, and Moody, as not “squarely address[ing] the issue here.” Lujan cannot argue that the questions (as opposed to a passing portion of the answers) were objectionable.

(“The trial court has ‘broad discretion’ regarding its management of the manner in which trial will be conducted, and has a duty to exercise that discretion.” ()).

The Arizona Constitution expressly guarantees “criminal defendants the right to represent themselves at trial.” -45 (1967) (Arizona’s constitution “vest[s] in a defendant the ‘explicit’ right to defend himself” ()); Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24 (“In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in perso

(“A defendant’s right to discharge counsel and proceed in propria persona is a qualified right once trial has begun.”).

(“[T]he right to self-representation does not signal playtime” for opposing counsel.).

which held that instructing the jury that the indictment “was not evidence against the accused” eliminated any prejudice.

(“[D]efendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules as an attorney.”); Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 216–17, ¶ 71 (noting that counsel may not use closing argument to convey personal beliefs or testify about facts not in evidence).

¶54 Generally speaking, parties are free to waive any number of rights, even constitutional rights such as the right to appeal, –14 (1946), the right to counsel, –23 (1994), the right to a jury trial, –66 (1976), and the right to be present during criminal proceedings, ¶ 54 (2003).

See Gunches, 225 Ariz. at 25 ¶ 12 (deciding “Gunches was not a ‘gray-area’ defendant” and “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Gunches competent to waive counsel and represent himself” at trial); –24 (1994) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his “waiver of counsel was invalid”); (affirming defendant as competent and his waiver of counsel as knowledgeable); (applying the test of “whether one is legally capable of waiving

–24 (1994) (involving colloquy with defendant about the dangers of his decision to represent himself).

According to Blomdahl, “[i]f an indigent person requires assistance to manage his finances, then he is unlikely to have the competency to utilize his right to self-representation[.]” (“[T]he law guarantees a defendant the right to waive counsel if he is mentally competent to do so.”) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)); ¶ 16 (App. 2020) (discussing Indiana v. Edwards, 545 U.S. 164 (2008), and how, compared to the competency r

¶7 “A mentally incompetent defendant cannot knowingly or intelligently waive constitutional rights.” 2 The evaluator diagnosed Moore with schizotypal personality traits and gave a rule out diagnosis of “schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, sub chronic.” 3 STATE v. MOORE Decision of the Court (1994).

“We do not, however, reverse convictions merely to punish a prosecutor’s misdeeds nor to deter future misconduct.”

nte when reasonable grounds existed.” ¶13 Although the superior court had a “continuing duty to inquire into [Wright’s] competency, and to order a Rule 11 examination sua sponte if reasonable grounds exist[ed],” Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 162, any additional Rule 11 examination was required only if new circumstances created a good faith doubt about Wright’s competency, –23 (1994); –61 (1975) (additional examinations may be ordered if there arises some reasonable ground to question the defendant’s

To be valid, the waiver of the right to counsel “must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).

330 (1994) (“[A]lthough the conduct was undeniably 26 STATE v. ARIAS Opinion of the Court improper, we look first to determine whether counsel’s actions were reasonably likely to have affected the jury’s verdict

(“It is uniformly held that all motions for pro per status made after jury selection has begun are untimely.

¶ 8 (2011) (-23 (1994)); see A.R.S.

“If the request is untimely, then whether defendant will be given the opportunity to waive counsel is within the discretion of the trial court.” De Nistor, 143 Ariz. at 413; (“A defendant’s right to discharge counsel and proceed in propria persona is a qualified right once trial has begun.”).

the Court trial” when it was “elicited from eight officers over three days and referred to by the prosecutor in both the opening statement and closing argument”), ¶ 32 (2012) (noting the misconduct in Pool was “continuous and well-documented” and declining to reverse when misconduct was “confirmed only twice by the trial judge”), –30 (1994) (“Whatever prejudice this line of questioning produced was mitigated by its brevity .