Cited by

“The first type of vouching involves personal assurances of a witness’s veracity” while “[t]he second type of vouching involves prosecutorial remarks that bolster a witness’s credibility by reference to matters outside the record.”

Placing the State’s prestige behind its witness “involves personal assurances of a witness’s veracity.” (quoting United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)).

(holding that even if a “comment during opening statement was improper at that point, it was a reasonable inference from evidence later introduced and would have been proper during closing argument,” so the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial), abrogate

–77 (1994); Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108.

This “type of vouching involves prosecutorial remarks that bolster a witness’s credibility by reference to matters outside the record.” (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)).

d not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.” Additionally, he asserts “the State made no 11 STATE v. ROMERO Opinion of the Court showing that the detectives’ testimony met the standard for lay opinion testimony”

¶59 Counsel impermissibly vouches for a witness when they personally assure a “witness’s veracity” or “bolster a witness’s credibility by reference to matters outside the record.” (quoting United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)).

But because this doctrine is “a rule of procedure, not substance,” the superior court “does not lack the power to change a ruling simply because it ruled on the question at an earlier stage.” (quoting Love, 121 Ariz. at 73).

e as a procedural doctrine rather than as a substantive limitation on the court’s power.”); (noting the law of the case doctrine “does not prevent a judge from reconsidering nonfinal rulings, ‘[n]or does it prevent a different judge, sitting on the same case, from reconsidering the first judge’s prior, nonfinal rulings’” ()).

see also U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557–60 (1988) (pretrial identification of defendant is admissible despite victim’s issues remembering the offense).

6 ARIK v. RGO Decision of the Court bound to follow a prior decision made in the same case by another judge in the same court.’”) (–79 (1994)).

(reasoning that a witness’s opinion as to whether a person depicted on video was the defendant was admissible under Rule 701 because it was based on his perception and “assisted the jury in determining a fact in issue—the identity of the person on the videotape”).

¶36 The “law of the case” is a procedural doctrine reflecting “the need for ‘an end to litigation and a final decision the parties can rely on.’” (citations omitted).

(quoting In re Monaghan’s Estate, ).

“Placing the prestige of the state behind its witness ‘involves personal assurances of a witness’s veracity,’ while ‘[t]he second type of vouching involves prosecutorial remarks that bolster a witness’s credibility by reference to matters outside the record.’” Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 217 ¶ 75 (alteration in original) ().

(holding that the confrontation clause is satisfied when the hearsay declarant is subject to cross-examination).

(“We fail to see, nor does defendant explain, how, by suggesting that one of its own witnesses might lie on the stand, the state was vouching for the credibility of its witness.”).

Placing the prestige of the state behind its witness “involves personal assurances of a witness’s veracity,” while “[t]he second type of vouching involves prosecutorial remarks that bolster a witness’s credibility by reference to matters outside the record.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)).

The first type of vouching consists of personal assurances of a witness’s truthfulness; the second type “involves prosecutorial remarks that bolster a witness’s credibility by reference to material outside the record.” (citations omitted).