Cited by

There is no requirement that the victim testify to actual fright.” (citation omitted).

(Improperly admitted hearsay evidence may be prejudicial.)

(finding that impermissible hearsay evidence did not prejudice the defendant because “other witnesses presented direct testimony on the same issue”).

¶12 “Either direct or circumstantial evidence may prove the victim’s apprehension.”

(“Because the trial court is in the best position to judge the admissibility of proffered testimony, we review most evidentiary claims on a discretionary standard.”); ¶ 21 (App. 1998) (“The trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged

(finding that admitting one erroneous statement did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial "[g]iven the clear quantum of evidence supporting" his conviction); –02 (1993) (finding no fundamental error from a 7

This is especially true when any reference to such evidence was brief and inadvertent, –02 (1993), and the evidence was neither emphasized nor mentioned in closing argument

It argued that the evidence was admissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 803(3) to show her then-existing state of mind.

(motion to preclude preserves issue for appeal); (erroneously admitted testimony reviewed for harmless error).

803(3) (excluding statements of the declarant’s “then-existing state of mind” from the rule against hearsay); (“The statements about [the victim’s] fear and desire to end the relationship helped explain Defendant’s motive.”).

I don’t understand him anymore.” (“[W]here the existence of premeditation is in issue, evidence of previous quarrels or difficulties between the accused and the victim is admissible.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

There is no requirement that the victim testify to actual fright.”

See State v. Wood , , 72, , 1177 (1994) ("Our disposition of the other issues on appeal, however, makes it unnecessary to reach this issue.").

2 See State v. Wood , , 72, , 1177 (1994).

(“There is no requirement that the victim testify to actual fright.”)

State v. Wood , , 64, , 1169 (1994).

(concluding the jury could have found that police officers, who did not testify, acted with apprehension or fear when they reacted to defendant’s brandishing of a revolver by firing at him).

Both direct and circumstantial evidence may be used to prove the victim’s apprehension, and “[t]here is no requirement that the victim testify to actual fright.”

STATE v. URIARTE-VELAZQUEZ Decision of the Court “need only intentionally act using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument so that the victim is placed in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury”; the victim does not need to testify to actual fright, but rather “[e]ither direct or circumstantial evidence may prove the victim’s apprehension.” (citation omitted).

see also, State v. Speaks, 691 A.2d 547, 550-51 (R.I.1997) (imperturbability, fortitude, or unawareness of intended victim not a defense to placing baby in reasonable apprehension of immediate injury).