Cited by

¶52 The second clause is a proviso that conditions the offense’s sentence classification, subjecting the defendant to enhanced punishment “if the minor is under fifteen years of age.” If the enhancement applies, “the degree of the felony is irrelevant” because the Dangerous Crime Against Children (“DCAC”) statute would “replace the usual sentencing scheme.”

lty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Indeed, a DCAC conviction requires a finding not required for dangerous offenses, namely, that the defendant “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of fifteen.” ().

(App. 1991) (A car may be a dangerous instrument simply under the circumstances under which it was used, and the State need not show the defendant had a specific intent to use the vehicle as a dangerous instrument.), vacated in part on other grounds

“In interpreting statutes, we look to the plain language as the most reliable indicator of meaning.” ¶ 9 (2002) ().

Over the State’s objection, the court granted Emedi’s request for an instruction requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt whether his conduct was “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ing] a victim under the age of fifteen.”

§ 13-705 and that his conduct was “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of fifteen”); –04 (1993) (“[T]he question of whether the child victim is the target of the defendant’s criminal conduct will rarely be an issue given the nature of the crimes .

See State v. (Roger) Williams, 102–04 (1993) (holding that the evidence did not show the defendant committed a crime against a child where the defendant, who was driving while intoxicated, struck and injured the occupants of a car, including a minor under the age of fifteen; under these specific circumstances, the court determined that the de

¶9 We first turn to the language of the statute because it is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” (citation omitted).

“If the language is plain, we need look no further[,]” and we apply it “unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results.” ¶ 11 (2003).

-04 (1993) ("[T]he question of whether the child victim is the target of the defendant's criminal conduct will rarely be an issue given the nature of the crimes listed in [what is now § 13-705].

¶12 Third, Offutt argues that the age of a minor victim, alone, fails to provide a sufficient factual basis for sentencing enhancement pursuant to A.R.S.

¶10 Third, Moore argues that the age of a minor victim, alone, fails to provide a sufficient factual basis for sentencing enhancement pursuant to § 13-705.

Based on the trial evidence and the jury’s guilty verdicts, Crews did not “fortuitously injure [the boy] by [his] unfocused conduct.” Sepahi, 206 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 11 ().

See State v. Williams , , 100, , 133 (1993) (in interpreting statute, language is best and most reliable indicator of meaning).

I. ¶48 Our primary “task in interpreting the meaning of a statute is to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.”

(noting the need to distinguish between elements of offenses that may qualify as DCAC and additional conditions for imposing sentence enhancements).

(recognizing that “best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning” is its language).

In doing so, , that conduct must be “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or targeted] a victim under the age of fifteen” before the DCAC statute applies.

POLK V. CAMPBELL (KRAPS) Opinion of the Court (reasoning that the reference to the DCACA showed the legislature’s intent that the minor in the sentencing provision refers to an actual child); Villegas, 227 Ariz. at 345 ¶ 3, 258 P.3d at 163 (“[A] dangerous crime against a child is a crime against a child qua child”) ( ).

ntionally placed [D.], a person under 15 years of age, in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.” Because the allegation was an element of each offense, the State, in order to meet its burden of proof, was required to present evidence that Garcia-Corrales and his compatriots “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of fifteen.”

at 477-78 ¶¶ 17, 22-23; -03 (1993) (noting Legislature “was attempting to respond effectively to those predators who pose a direct and continuing threat to the children of Arizona.

A statute’s language is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” N. Valley Emergency Specialists, ¶ 9 , ( , ).