Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Williams, 854 P.2d 131.

245 citing documents.

State v. Felix 349 P.3d 1117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Felix 349 P.3d 1117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 34 Felix relies on our supreme court’s
State of Arizona v. Pamela Jacqueline Williams 343 P.3d 470 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Pamela Jacqueline Williams 343 P.3d 470 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
¶12 P.2d 131 (1993), Williams nevertheless argues the state was required “to prove that [she] was focused on or targeting a peace officer.” In that case, our supreme court analyzed the meaning of another sentence-enhancing statute based on victim status: dangerous crimes “committed against a minor under fifteen years
State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶21 In order for a defendant to be sentenced under the DCAC statute, his criminal “conduct must be focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target a victim under the age of fifteen.” ¶ 19
State of Arizona v. Anthony Lewis 340 P.3d 415 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Anthony Lewis 340 P.3d 415 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
12 STATE v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court ¶32 “Our task in interpreting the meaning of a statute is to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.”
State of Arizona v. Joann Bon 338 P.3d 989 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Joann Bon 338 P.3d 989 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
“‘We look first to the statute’s language because we expect it to be the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.’” Id.
State of Arizona v. Christian Paul Royalty 336 P.3d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Christian Paul Royalty 336 P.3d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
In so doing, “‘[w]e look first to the statute’s language because we expect it to be the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.’” Id.
Bourne v. McClennen 333 P.3d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Bourne v. McClennen 333 P.3d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
When a term is not defined in a statute, we will look first to the statute’s language to determine legislative intent, as the language is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” , 854 P.2d at 131, 133 (1993) ( , (internal quotation marks omitted)).
State v. Chavez-Tavena Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Chavez-Tavena Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
¶28 For the DCAC enhancement to apply, “the defendant’s conduct must be focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target a victim under the age of fifteen.” -04, -37 (1993); see also A.R.S.
State of Arizona v. Tynerial Ray Kindred 307 P.3d 1038 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Tynerial Ray Kindred 307 P.3d 1038 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
“We look first to the statute’s language because we expect it to be ‘the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.’”
TP Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Simms 307 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State of Arizona v. Robert Francisco Borquez 307 P.3d 51 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Robert Francisco Borquez 307 P.3d 51 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
(to interpret meaning of plain and unambiguous statute court must consider its language, which is “‘the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning’”)
TP Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Simms 307 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
“The court’s chief goal in interpreting a statute is ‘to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.’ ” ¶ 11 , ( , ).
State v. Kendrick 306 P.3d 85 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State v. Kendrick 306 P.3d 85 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
In construing a statute, our task is to “fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.” , (citations omitted).
Cable One, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 304 P.3d 1098 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Cable One, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 304 P.3d 1098 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
§ 42-14401, and attempt to “fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.”
Robert Baker v. University Physicians Healthcare 296 P.3d 42 Ariz. 2013
Robert Baker v. University Physicians Healthcare 296 P.3d 42 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Marcus Deshaun Tucker, Clifton James Cuttler II and Andre Lavelle Armstrong 290 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Marcus Deshaun Tucker, Clifton James Cuttler II and Andre Lavelle Armstrong 290 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
In determining that intent, “‘[w]e look first to the statute’s language because we expect it to be the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.’” Id.
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Woodburn 292 P.3d 201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Followed State ex rel. Montgomery v. Woodburn 292 P.3d 201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Richard Anderson v. Valley Union High School District 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Richard Anderson v. Valley Union High School District 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Aaron Raymond Fikes 267 P.3d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State of Arizona v. Aaron Raymond Fikes 267 P.3d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Not project a glaring or dazzling light.” ¶6 “The court‟s chief goal in interpreting a statute is „to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.‟”
Arizona Department of Revenue v. South Point Energy Center, LLC 268 P.3d 387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Arizona Department of Revenue v. South Point Energy Center, LLC 268 P.3d 387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
¶ 12 In construing a statute, our goal is “to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.”
State v. Gamez 258 P.3d 263 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Gamez 258 P.3d 263 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
We look first to the language of the statute because it is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” , (citation omitted).
In Re Marriage of Gibbs 258 P.3d 221 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Gibbs v. Gibbs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
In Re Marriage of Gibbs 258 P.3d 221 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
We interpret statutes with the goal of “ ‘fulfilling] the intent of the legislature.’ ” , , 1230 *408 (1996)
Gibbs v. Gibbs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
We interpret statutes with the goal of “„fulfill[ing] the intent of the legislature.‟”
Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered 258 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Winterbottom v. Ronan 258 P.3d 182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Winterbottom v. Ronan 258 P.3d 182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered 258 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
“We first consider the statute’s language ‘because we ex *358 pect it to be the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.’ ” , ( , ).
State v. Villegas 258 P.3d 162 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State v. Villegas 258 P.3d 162 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
(“[A] dangerous crime against a child is a crime against a child qua child.”); see also 2008 Ariz. Sess.