Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Williams, 854 P.2d 131.

245 citing documents.

State v. Castaneda 102 P.3d 985 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
And although our decision cited Samano approvingly, our holding rested on the core of the supreme court’s , and the supreme court's opinion in Sepahi reaffirmed its prior decision in Williams .
State v. Miranda-Cabrera 99 P.3d 35 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Miranda-Cabrera 99 P.3d 35 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Arizona State Democratic Party v. State 98 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Carl Seel v. Tim Sifert Ariz. 2004
Carl Seel v. Tim Sifert Ariz. 2004
A. ¶6 In interpreting a statute, we first look to the statutory language “because we expect it to be ‘the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.’” ( ).
North Valley Emergency, Specialists, L.L.C. v. Santana 93 P.3d 501 Ariz. 2004
North Valley Emergency, Specialists, L.L.C. v. Santana 93 P.3d 501 Ariz. 2004
¶ 9 A statute’s language is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” , (quoting Janson v. Chñstensen, , ).
State v. Ontiveros 81 P.3d 330 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Ontiveros 81 P.3d 330 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
We look first to the language of the statute as “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” , ( , ).
State v. Tsinnijinnie 80 P.3d 284 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Tsinnijinnie 80 P.3d 284 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
We look first to the language of the statute as “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” , ( , ).
Bilke v. State 80 P.3d 269 Ariz. 2003
Bilke v. State 80 P.3d 269 Ariz. 2003
The court’s chief goal in interpreting a statute is “to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.”
State v. Sepahi 78 P.3d 732 Ariz. 2003
State v. Sepahi 78 P.3d 732 Ariz. 2003
at 189 ¶ 14, 61 P.3d at 483 (alteration in original) (-03, -36 (1993)).
State v. Davis 79 P.3d 64 Ariz. 2003
State v. Givens 76 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Givens 76 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Arizona Water Co. v. Arizona Department of Water Resources 73 P.3d 1267 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Arizona Water Co. v. Arizona Department of Water Resources 73 P.3d 1267 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Martin 69 P.3d 1000 Ariz. 2003
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Martin 69 P.3d 1000 Ariz. 2003
-69, -87 (1991); 3 Our first point of reference, of course, is the statutory language, which we expect to be “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.”
Boynton v. Anderson 66 P.3d 88 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Boynton v. Anderson 66 P.3d 88 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
“The legislative history indicates quite clearly that the enactment of § 13-604.01 was calculated to reach criminals who prey specifically upon children.”
GARDEN LAKES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Madigan 62 P.3d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
GARDEN LAKES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Madigan 62 P.3d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Mitchell 62 P.3d 616 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Mitchell 62 P.3d 616 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Sepahi 61 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Sepahi 61 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
¶ 9 , , Sepahi argues that his offenses were not dangerous crimes committed against a child because "§ 13-604.01 requires more than a victim under age fifteen," and because his crimes were "not the type of high-recidivism offenses which gav
Facilitec, Inc. v. Hibbs 59 P.3d 803 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Facilitec, Inc. v. Hibbs 59 P.3d 803 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Powers v. Carpenter 51 P.3d 338 Ariz. 2002
Powers v. Carpenter 51 P.3d 338 Ariz. 2002
Higginbottom v. State 51 P.3d 972 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Higginbottom v. State 51 P.3d 972 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Our task “is to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.”
State v. Christian 47 P.3d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Christian 47 P.3d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
In Re Ryan A. 39 P.3d 543 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
In Re Ryan A. 39 P.3d 543 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
(“When construing statutes, our goal is ‘to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.’ ” ( , )).
Strojnik v. General Insurance Co. of America 36 P.3d 1200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Strojnik v. General Insurance Co. of America 36 P.3d 1200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
We initially examine the language of § 20-1123 to discern the legislature’s meaning, , and, if that language is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to an absurd result, we will apply it without employing other principles of statutory construction.
Arpaio v. Steinle 35 P.3d 114 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Arpaio v. Steinle 35 P.3d 114 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Skiba 19 P.3d 1255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Skiba 19 P.3d 1255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
*541 DISCUSSION ¶ 8 In construing a statute, our goal is “to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.”
State v. Guillory 18 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State v. Guillory 18 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
Section 13-901.01(G) states in part: A person who has been convicted three times of personal possession or use ...
State v. Pereyra 18 P.3d 146 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001