Cited by

a mistrial if necessary in the interests of justice,” or “any other appropriate sanction.” “But any sanction must be proportional to the violation and must have ‘a minimal effect on the evidence and merits.’ Factors to consider include importance of the witness or evidence, the degree of surprise, and bad faith.” Payne, 233 Ariz. at 518 ¶ 155 (internal citation omitted) ().

(“[B]ecause Defendant had been given timely notice of the identity of the State’s latent print and blood experts, he should not have been surprised when they were called to testify about their findings.”).

The “[d]enial of a [disclosure] sanction is generally not an abuse of discretion if the trial court believes the defendant will not be prejudiced.”

¶9 “Whether to impose a sanction for late disclosure and which sanction to impose are discretionary decisions left to the trial court; we will not disturb those decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 114 (2004); (“Denial of a [disclosure] sanction is generally not an abuse of discretion if the trial court believes the defendant will not be prejudiced.”).

“But any sanction must be proportional to the violation and must have ‘a minimal effect on the evidence and merits.’” ¶ 155 (2013) ().

Instead, they “are admissible if offered for some legitimate purpose other than attacking witness credibility.”

However, absent an abuse of discretion, this court “will not disturb the trial court’s choice of sanction or its decision not to impose a sanction.”

602 and 103; (requiring the proponent of precluded testimony “to make the offer of proof so that the reviewing court can determine whether the trial judge erred in precluding the evidence”).

See Bank of Am., 196 Ariz. at 175 ¶ 8; (“[J]udicial estoppel is generally not applied when the first inconsistent position was not a significant factor in the initial proceeding.”).

and to permit the reviewing court to determine if the exclusion affected the substantial rights of the party offering it”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); (explaining a party claiming prejudice from the exclusion of evidence must, “[a]t a minimum, [provide] an offer of proof stating with reasonable specificity what the evidence would have shown”).

P. 46 (to preserve a claim of error, a party communicates “the action that it wants the court to take or that it objects to, along with the grounds for the request or objection”); (“When an objection to the introduction of evidence has been sustained, an offer of proof showing the evidence’s relevance and admissibility is ordinarily required to assert error on appeal.”); Rule 103(a)(2).

Even though an offer-of-proof requirement may be “relaxed” when the proof consists of an answer on cross-examination that counsel will not normally know in advance, “something more than speculation about possible answers is required to show prejudice.”

“Three requirements must exist before the court can apply judicial estoppel: (1) the parties must be the same, (2) the question involved must be the same, and (3) the party asserting the inconsistent position must have been successful in the prior judicial proceeding.”

(citing Standage Ventures, -84 (1977)).