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Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290.

156 citing documents.

State v. McKenna 214 P.3d 1037 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State v. McKenna 214 P.3d 1037 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
103(a)(2) (error may not be predicated on ruling excluding evidence unless substance of evidence shown by offer of proof or apparent from context); , (“[The] proponent of the precluded evidence must ...
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Newell 210 P.3d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Newell 210 P.3d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Harrod 183 P.3d 519 Ariz. 2008
State v. Harrod 183 P.3d 519 Ariz. 2008
State v. Tucker 160 P.3d 177 Ariz. 2007
State v. Tucker 160 P.3d 177 Ariz. 2007
State v. McGill 140 P.3d 930 Ariz. 2006
State v. McGill 140 P.3d 930 Ariz. 2006
(holding that a finding of cruelty establishes the F.6 aggravator even without reaching heinousness or depravity).
State v. Brown 129 P.3d 947 Ariz. 2006
State v. Brown 129 P.3d 947 Ariz. 2006
“Judicial estoppel is not intended to protect individual litigants but is invoked to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing a litigant from using the courts to gain an unfair advantage.” State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 182
State v. Brown 115 P.3d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Brown 115 P.3d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Secord 88 P.3d 587 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Secord 88 P.3d 587 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Even if misconduct occurs, it “is harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”
State v. Cazares 72 P.3d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. Ernesto Luis Cazares Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. Ernesto Luis Cazares Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Cazares 72 P.3d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Tucker 68 P.3d 110 Ariz. 2003
State v. Tucker 68 P.3d 110 Ariz. 2003
(2) the question involved must be the same, and (3) the party asserting the inconsistent position must have been successful in the prior judicial proceeding.” , (citation omitted).
State v. Sucharew 66 P.3d 59 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Sucharew 66 P.3d 59 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
¶ 10 The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of privileges for confidential communications and is “rigorously guarded ‘to encourage full and frank communications between attorneys and them clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.’ ” 2 n. 6 , n. 6 (1996) (citation omitted).
State of Arizona v. Kenneth Dale Meinhardt Ariz. 2003
State of Arizona v. Kenneth Dale Meinhardt Ariz. 2003
State v. Towery 64 P.3d 828 Ariz. 2003
State of Arizona v. Roger Wayne Murray Ariz. 2003
State of Arizona v. Roger Wayne Murray Ariz. 2003
P.2d 1287 (1999); P.2d 784 (1997); P.2d 290 (1996); P.2d 1214 (1996).
State v. Towery 64 P.3d 828 Ariz. 2003
State v. Minnitt 55 P.3d 774 Ariz. 2002
State v. Minnitt 55 P.3d 774 Ariz. 2002
State v. Blackman 38 P.3d 1192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Blackman 38 P.3d 1192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Even if misconduct occurs, it “is harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” , 920 P.2d *542 290, 307 (1996) ( 600 , 1203 (1993)).
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
We have interpreted Penry, Eddings, and Lockett as directing the sentencing judge to “consider evidence proffered for mitigation.” , 598 ¶ 61, , 1289 ¶ 61 (1998)(with respect to mitigating evidence, the sentencing judge is “entitled to give it the weight it deserves”); , (“The sentencer therefore must consider the defendant’s upbringing if proffered but is not required to give it significant mitigating weight.”).
State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
-87 , -09 (1996) (prosecutor could be accountable for failure of expert to transmit nine-month-old report until less than week before trial).
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Maricopa County 993 P.2d 1137 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Maricopa County 993 P.2d 1137 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
¶7 Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that protects the integrity of the judicial system by “preventing] a party from taking an inconsistent position in successive or separate actions.”
State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
Cruelty requires conclusive evidence that the victim was conscious during the infliction of violence and *421 experienced significant “uncertainty as to [her] ultimate fate.”
State v. Sharp 973 P.2d 1171 Ariz. 1999
State v. Sharp 973 P.2d 1171 Ariz. 1999
(holding that a trial court’s finding of cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt sufficiently establishes the F.6 factor).
State v. Hughes 969 P.2d 1184 Ariz. 1998
State v. Hughes 969 P.2d 1184 Ariz. 1998
‘We are not eager to reverse a conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct as a method to deter such future conduct.”

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