Cited by

Berger, 111 Ariz. at 339; (“[T]he violation of a procedural rule designed to safeguard a constitutional right is not necessarily the same thing as a violation of the right itself.”).

("In order for a reviewing court to find an abuse of discretion, appellant must demonstrate that he suffered prejudice by nondisclosure."); ("The trial court's failure to impose a particular sanction, or any sanction at all, was not an abuse of discretion" when the defendant had "suffered no prejudice.") In denying the motions for sanctions, the superior court found that Keeten failed to show any prejudice resulting from the delayed disclosure

(“In order for a reviewing court to find an abuse of discretion, appellant must demonstrate that he suffered prejudice by nondisclosure.”); (“The trial court’s failure to impose a particular sanction, or any sanction at all, was not an abuse of discretion[]” because defendant “suffered no prejudice here.”).

–56, –99 (1996) (noting trial court’s discretion under Rule 15.7 in holding trial court did not err in allowing state to file a notice of intent after the deadline).

(“she’s been, I think, honest” and “I think he was an honest man” not improper vouching viewed in context of overall closing argument).

We observed that, based on other definitions in other contexts, armed robbery is a “ ‘erime[ ] of violence.’ ” Id.

We observed that, based on other definitions in other contexts, armed robbery is a “‘crime[] of violence.’” Id.

See id.; (holding that when read in context the prosecutor’s comments, “[n]ow she’s been, I think, honest when she says she wasn’t even aware that [other witnesses] had seen her” and “I think [another witness] was an honest man, certainly an honest man, but I think he made an honest mistake” were

(“she’s been, I think, honest” and “I think he was an honest man” not improper vouching in context of overall closing argument).

See also, (“she’s been, I think, honest” and “I think he was an honest man” not improper vouching viewed in context of overall closing argument).

(holding that prosecutor’s repeated preface of statements with, “I think,” was not improper and, in any case, did not rise to the level of fundamental error); United States v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that use of “we know” was proper because it was used “to mars

crime[s] of violence.” (statutory definition of robbery “requires the use of threat of force,” which supported former A.R.S.

(holding that if a witness was eliminated to facilitate the theft, “the murder was part and parcel of the robbery”).

(holding not prejudicial the state’s inadvertent failure to provide defendant notice of intent to seek the death penalty under Rule 15.1.g(l) until eighty-seven days after such notice was required because defendant had actual notice of the prosecutor’s intent to seek the death penalty).

Rather, the state assumes the additional burden of showing that pecuniary gain was “a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely the result of the murder.” , 433 ¶ 32, see, , (affirming pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance where defendant killed to facilitate escape after robbery).

(dangerous nature of kidnapping must be separately alleged and proved before it may be used to enhance sentence); -23, ¶¶ 32-37 , -96 (App.1998) (re *336 quiring State to file section 13-604(P) allegations before the case was "actually

Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 551 , 804 P.2d at 84

¶ 21 , (senteneer considered prosecutor’s recommendation against death penalty as mitigating factor), -16 , -80 (1989) (in weighing mitigating factors, court considered probation officer’s presentence report recommending against death pe

we upheld the denial of a motion to preclude the state from seeking the death penalty where the state filed its written notice eighty-seven days late, because it was undisputed that the defendant had actual oral notice as evidenced by discussions during plea negotiations and defense co