Cited by

To establish relishing, the State must establish “that the defendant sa[id] or d[id] something, other than the commission of the crime itself, to show he savored the murder.”

(finding that sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl was sufficiently similar to sexual contact with a seven-year-old girl); - 93 (1996) (finding no abuse of discretion by admitting other-act evidence of defendant’s sexual encounter with his fourteen-year-old girlfriend when the charged offense involved a seven-year-old female); ¶¶ 19-20 (holding that the other-act evidence was properly admitted for both

Granville emphasized that any mitigating circumstances to be considered by the jury must be “proved by the defendant or present in the record.” –73 ¶¶ 17–18 (2005); (“That the burden is on the defendant reinforces the conclusion that his personal decision not to present certain mitigating evidence is within his discretion.”).

¶ 61 (2002) (“Because the trial court is best situated to conduct the Rule 403 balance, we will reverse its ruling only for abuse of discretion.” (), superseded on other grounds by Ariz. R. Crim.

“When a defendant concurrently has self-representation and representation by counsel, hybrid representation results.” ().

See State v. Roscoe (Roscoe II), n.2 (1996) (“Identity and modus operandi are obviously closely related, if not identical, since an unrelated act with a significantly similar modus operandi may identify the defendant as the person who committed the crime charged.”).

To determine whether this has occurred, this Court analyzes: “(1) whether the remarks called improper matters to the jury’s attention, and (2) the probability under the circumstances that the improper remarks influenced the jury’s verdict.” –97 (1996).

for in cases of prosecutorial misconduct, Arizona does not recognize cumulative 7 STATE v. HENDERSON Decision of the Court error because “something that is not prejudicial error in and of itself does not become such error when coupled with something else that is not prejudicial error.”

Our general rule has been stated several times over the years, and was recently stated in State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 21, as follows: “[T]his court does not recognize the so-called cumulative error doctrine.”

¶ 70, (stating that “[a] defendant may waive the presentation of mitigation if he is legally competent to do so”); Kayer, 194 Ariz. at 437 ¶ 46, 984 P.2d at 45 (stating that a defendant has the “freedom not to cooperate with a mitigation specialist and thereby potentially limit the mitigation evidence that is offered”); (stating that it is the defendant’s “personal decision not to present certain 8 STATE V. GUNCHES Opinion of the Court mitigating evidence”).

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Roscoe (Roscoe II), n.2, n.2 (1996) (“Identity and modus operandi are obviously closely related, if not identical, since an unrelated act with a significantly similar modus operandi may identify the defendant as the person who committed the crime charged.”).

¶42 Ordinarily, Arizona does not recognize the cumulative error doctrine because “something that is not prejudicial error in and of itself does not become such error when coupled with something else that is not prejudicial error.”

¶8 We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, and questions of constitutional law and statutory interpretation de novo.

If a photograph is relevant, the court must determine if it is inflammatory and, if so, whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the photograph’s probative value.” (citations omitted).

Id.; (characterizing hybrid representation as “disfavored”).