Cited by

A fact-specific inquiry is necessary to determine whether an error is harmless, and it must be evaluated within the context of properly admitted evidence

¶ 63 (1999) (affirming the denial of a Willits instruction when it was "highly questionable" that the evidence was exculpatory); ¶ 38 (App. 2002) (affirming the denial of a Willits instruction because defendant's claim that the items may have produced exculpatory evidence was

The question is whether, on the evidence presented, rational factfinders could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 24 (1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶¶ 26–28 (1999) (finding sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict based on "a web of suspicious circumstances tight enough that a reasonable person could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant was the perpetrator").

¶ 12 (App. 1999), -69, ¶¶ 4-5 11 STATE v. JAYNES Decision of the Court (2001); ¶ 27 (1999) (noting false or misleading statements to police tend to "show[] consciousness of guilt").

rred, the defendant’s accident defense was refuted by “virtually every doctor involved in [the victim’s] emergency care,” and there were inconsistencies in the defendant’s account); Payne, 233 Ariz. at 507, ¶ 77 (finding substantial evidence the defendant caused the victim’s injuries based on testimony that the injuries likely occurred while in the defendant’s care); ¶ 27 (1999) (observing that the defendant’s false and inconsistent statements showed consciousness of guilt).

dily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.” “[A] victim’s state of mind is relevant to show a defendant’s motive under Rule 803(3)” as long as the statement mirrors the “declarant’s present feeling or future intention rather than look backward, describing declarant’s past memory or belief about another’s conduct.” – 96, ¶¶ 32, 34 (1999); see Wood, 180 Ariz. at 62 (“The statements about [the victim’s] fear and desire to end the relati

But “[e]rrors not objected to will be reviewed only for fundamental error.” ¶ 64 (1999).

w, or statutory privilege.”); Trebus, 189 Ariz. at 625 (“[I]ssues such as witness credibility and factual inconsistencies are ordinarily for trial.”); see also Crimmins, 137 Ariz. at 42–43 (noting that caselaw “clearly prohibit[s] a trial court from considering an attack on an indictment based on the nature, weight or sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury”); ¶ 11 (1999) (“Evidence presented to a grand jury need not be admissible in trial.”); Franzi, 139 Ariz. at 565 (“[H]earsay

Although the prosecutor “urge[d] the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence,” id., she argued facts that were in evidence, and there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction on Count 3, ¶ 28 (1999) (“While each element of the offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, each supporting fact need not be.”).

(declarant’s statement about conduct of another person not admissible under Rule 803(3) state-of-mind hearsay exception).

“In reviewing the evidence, we must draw all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” ¶ 27 (1999); (providing that evidence of a defendant’s mental state must typically be inferred from the “behaviors and other circumstances surrounding the event”).

Citing Maretick, he maintains that grand jury proceedings are different.

¶8 The evidence here, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions, and drawing all reasonable inferences in support thereof, ¶ 27 (1999), is as follows: At approximately 6:00 p.m.

¶ 62 (1999) (“When police negligently fail to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, [a Willits instruction] permits the jury to infer that the evidence would have been exculpatory.”).

“An objection is sufficiently made if it provides the judge with an opportunity to provide a remedy.” ¶ 64 (1999); see also State v. Kinney, 225 Ariz. 3 STATE v. HUDSON Decision of the Court 550, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (“To preserve an argument for review, the defendant must make a sufficient argument to allow a trial cou

¶16 A Willits instruction permits a jury to infer from the State’s failure to preserve evidence that such evidence “would have been exculpatory.” ¶ 62 (1999).