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¶¶ 22-23 (1998) (holding a court may not present a defendant with a choice that requires the relinquishment of a constitutional right and any “waiver” elicited from a defendant confronted with such a “constitutionally impermissible” choice is necessarily involuntary)

inal context, “[a] single allegation of lost confidence in counsel does not require the appointment of new counsel, and disagreements over defense strategies do not constitute an irreconcilable conflict.” ¶ 29 (2005); see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (right to counsel does not guarantee a “meaningful relationship” with counsel); ¶ 13, 509 ¶ 23 (1998) (holding that defendant was entitled to new counsel because the record was “replete with examples of a deep and irreconcilable conflict”

“It is constitutionally impermissible to require a party entitled to counsel to choose between self-representation and representation by a lawyer with whom [they have] a completely fractured relationship, clearly an irreconcilable conflict.” Tammy M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 21 (App. 2017) ( ¶ 23 (1998)).

¶ 13 (1998) (noting the record was “replete with examples of a deep and irreconcilable conflict” between the defendant and his appointed attorney).

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) (counsel); (counsel); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969) (decision to plead guilty); n.3 (1984) (decision to plead guilty); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (right to appeal).

¶ 11 (1998) (citation omitted).

An indigent defendant, however, is not “entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.” ¶ 6 (2004) (quoting State v. Moody (“Moody I”), ¶ 11 (1998)).

State v. Moody (Moody I), ¶ 23 (1998) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

at 187, ¶ 31 (-87 (1987), ¶ 11 (1998)).

Nor is the defendant “entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.” ¶ 11 (1998) ().

conflict; the timing of the motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time period already 4 STATE v. MEDINA-MARTINEZ Decision of the Court elapsed between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel; and quality of counsel.” -87 (1987); ¶ 11 (1998).

¶ 11 (1998).2 ¶6 "The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to representation by counsel."

¶ 16 Drawing on criminal cases involving the right to counsel, , , the Daniel Y. court observed that the waiver of the right to counsel cannot be “easily presumed.” ¶¶ 15-21 , 77 P.3d at 58-60 .

However, the defendant is not “entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.” ¶ 11 (1998) (citation omitted).

See, –08, ¶¶ 13, 16 (1998) (irreconcilable conflict existed between defendant and attorney who were “almost at blows” and “antagonistic towards each other”).

lure to strictly comply with Rule 38(d) constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error, ¶¶ 19-20, -08 3 & n.2, -36 & n.2 (2009); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984) (complete denial of counsel, or counsel’s utter failure to subject state’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, renders adversary process presumptively unreliable).

State v. Moody (Moody I), ¶ 23, 968 23 STATE V. GOUDEAU Opinion of the Court P.2d 578, 582 (1998).

Though a defendant is entitled to representation by competent counsel, he is not entitled to “counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.” ¶ 11 (1998).