Cited by

¶ 18, (holding a party moving to strike an entire jury panel “must affirmatively demonstrate that a fair and impartial jury was not secured or that some material violation occurred”).

¶ 26 (1998) (“One witness may not .

“We will reverse only if the instructions, taken together, would have misled the jurors.“ ¶ 35 (1998).

¶30 Williamson acknowledges that expert and lay witnesses may give opinion testimony, even though it embraces an ultimate issue of fact, when it is “‘helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.’” quoting Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 38, (internal citation omitted).

[They were] merely stating [their] reasons for not believing the defendant’s story.” ¶ 26, (alternative holding).

704(a); ¶ 26, (“Lay witnesses may give opinion testimony, even as to the ultimate issue, when it is ‘rationally based on the perception of the witness and .

“Where the law is 4 STATE v. CRAFT Decision of the Court adequately covered by the instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.” ¶ 35

Grell II, , *224 135 P.3d at 708

But the weighing of evidence by the trial court in that case is irrelevant to our review of whether the trial court in this case abused its discretion, as “[t]he trial judge has broad discretion in determining the weight and credibility given to mental health evidence.” Grell II, 212 Ariz. at 528 ¶ 58, 135 P.3d at 708 ( ¶ 64, ).

¶47 It remains the responsibility of the trial judge, 23 however, “to exercise sound discretion in balancing probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice.” Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 141 ¶ 115, 140 P.3d at 924 (quoting State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 64 ¶ 32, ).

helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” ’ ¶ 26 , (quoting Ariz. R. Evid.

words or actions that show debasement or perversion,” State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 439 ¶ 34, (internal quotation omitted), and “requires that the defendant say or do something, other than the commission of the crime itself, to show he 41 savored the murder.” -68 ¶ 54, -80 (1998) (internal quotation omitted).

helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.'" ¶ 26 , (quoting Ariz. R. Evid.

See State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 71 ¶ 73, (concluding no connection existed between the defendant’s low IQ and the murder).

We “„will not reverse a conviction if an error is clearly 8 harmless.‟”

Nevertheless, Defendant argues the trial court erred in finding her West Virginia license was “cancelled,” as opposed to “expired.” Even assuming the trial court erred in this respect, we “will not reverse a conviction if an error is clearly harmless.” ¶33

“Where the law is adequately covered by the instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.” ¶ 35

See State v. Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570, 579-80 ¶¶ 31-33, -90 (2002) (rejecting argument that additional voir dire should have been permitted because the Court was “unwilling to speculate as a basis for reversal” of conviction); State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 61 ¶ 18, (declining to “indulge 7 in .

¶ 67, (giving little weight, if any, to cooperation as a mitigating circumstance if defendant is “motivated by self- interest”).

The cases that the State cites in support of its proposed jury instruction regarding the especially heinous, cruel, or depraved factor are: , , Knapp

¶115 We recognize the danger that photos of the victims may “be used to generate sympathy for the victim and his or her family.” ¶ 32