Cited by

¶ 2 (2000) (barring retrial on a ).

cantly delayed resolution” of Drake’s post-conviction relief proceeding without “any sound reason.” ¶33 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ( ).

Opinion of the Court [errors] shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.’” (alterations in original) ( ¶ 46 (2010))); ¶ 68 (2022); ¶ 67 (2007); ¶ 31 (1998).

While statements that unfairly slander opposing counsel’s integrity are improper, critiques of defense theories and tactics are generally permissible, (no impropriety where prosecutor suggested in closing “that defense counsel was attempting to mislead the jury”).

“Prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error only if (1) misconduct exists and (2) ‘a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.’” Morris, 215 at 335 ¶ 46 (citation omitted); ¶ 32 (1998) (similar).

¶33 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial error, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s error “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Sanders, 245 Ariz. at 132 ¶ 92 ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

To warrant reversal, the alleged prosecutorial error must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Although an improper comment on defendant’s failure to [allocute] can be harmless error in some cases, in other cases it can be fundamental error.” ¶ 63 (1998) (internal citation omitted).

In other words, the cumulative error must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Robinson, (reversal requires conduct that “permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial” ()).

-79, ¶ 25 (1998) (noting that Arizona “does not recognize the so-called cumulative error doctrine” except “when the court is evaluating a claim that prosecutorial misconduct deprived [the] defendant of a fair trial”) (citation omitted).

To warrant reversal, prosecutorial error must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

For reversal, a defendant must show a prosecutor’s alleged misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process” and was “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial.” ¶ 26 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Prosecutorial error occurs where the prosecutor’s conduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

To prevail, Daniel “must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make [his] conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 152 (2006) ( ¶ 26 (1998), ).

re multiple instances of improper questioning, suggestions, implications to the jury and times when the State “engaged in personal attacks or inappropriate behavior in the courtroom.”3 To show prosecutorial misconduct, “a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” -79 ¶ 25 (1998).

Typically, we review each alleged incident individually for error, after which we decide whether the cumulative effect of any errors we find “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 106 (2013) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

on] passed several exits along the way and eventually comes to a stop after the exit on Avondale Boulevard here on the shoulder.” Thus, the prosecutor technically erred by referring to “several exits.” But the error does not warrant reversal because it was not “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of trial.” Morris, 215 Ariz. at 335, ¶ 46 ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

Reversal is warranted only if the misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998) (quotation omitted).

¶9 To prevail on her claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Valdivia must prove the misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998) (citation omitted).