Cited by

¶ 46 (2007); ¶ 26 (1998).

(no misconduct where prosecutor called defense theories “outrageous,” a “smoke screen,” and supported only by “innuendo and inference”), ¶ 61, (misconduct to argue that defense counsel and experts “fabricated” insanity defense without evidentiary support).

See Morris, 215 Ariz. at 339, ¶ 67, 160 P.3d at 218; -79, 88, ¶¶ 24- 26, 74, -91, 1200 (1998) (defendant deprived of fair trial based on cumulative effect of prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s failure to testify; argument outside the record; allegation defendant fabricated insanity defense; and appeal to jurors’ fears).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶15 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26, (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

¶11 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

– 87 ¶¶ 63–64, –99 (1998).

¶ 59, (“Counsel’s questioning and argument .

of such magnitude that defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.” ¶ 32, ( ¶ 62, ).

See, ¶ 70, (noting that it is improper argument to appeal to “fear”).

ncorrect remarks about the evidence during closing argument, and “invent[ed] testimony” at sentencing “to influence and confuse the sentencing judge.” ¶30 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26, (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26, (citation omitted).

¶ 75, (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”); 11 –79 ¶ 25, –91 (1998) (stating general rule of not recognizing cumulative error with the exception of claims involving prosecutorial misconduct).

¶15 Dorsey also alleges prosecutorial misconduct, alleging that the State “prosecut[ed] the case without fully investigating evidence in the case, misstating Phoenix City Code, etc.” “In reviewing prosecutorial misconduct, we focus on whether it affected the proceedings in such a way as to deny the defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 32

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 6 STATE v. WELLS Decision of the Court conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26, (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

-79, ¶¶ 25–26, –91 (1998).

Misconduct includes a prosecutor “impugn[ing] the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel.” ¶ 59

¶ 59, ("Jury argument that impugns the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel is .

“red herrings.” The prosecutor also told jurors that defense counsel asked them to speculate and “check [their] common sense at the door.” 9 STATE v. RAMOS Opinion of the Court ¶25 “Jury argument that impugns the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel is [] improper,” ¶ 59, but “[c]riticism of defense theories and tactics is a proper subject of closing argument,” U.S. v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997).

“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be „so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.‟” ¶ 26, (citations omitted).

“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that 12 STATE v. LEYBA Decision of the Court the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” ¶ 26

“To be improper, ‘the prosecutor’s comments must be calculated to direct the jurors’ attention to the defendant’s exercise of his [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege.’” ¶ 64, (citation omitted).

21, 2013) (alterations in original) (“Counsel’s ‘[s]uggestion by question or innuendo of unfavorable matter which is not in evidence and which would be irrelevant, or for which no proof exists[,] is improper and can constitute misconduct’”); ¶ 59, (“Counsel’s questioning and argument, however, cannot make insinuations that are not supported by the evidence.”).