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¶11 To show that reversible misconduct occurred, the defendant must establish “that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).

We then consider whether the cumulative effect of individual allegations “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26, (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

¶ 59 , (noting that “[ejounsel can argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.”); , (recognizing that counsel may “summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from t

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79 ¶ 26, (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

For prosecutorial misconduct to qualify as fundamental error, the error must be “‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” State v. Harrod, 218 Ariz. 268, ¶ 35

¶26 Citing In re Zawada, 208 Ariz. 232, P.2d 1184 (1998), Manuel contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by disrespecting Dr. Cunningham, Manuel’s mitigation expert, and suggesting that Cunningham reached his conclusions only because he was being paid.

¶9 Although prosecutors and peace officers alike have a broad interest in attaining justice in every case, peace officers, like prosecutors, also have a particular interest in seeing that the criminal cases their offices have investigated and developed are successfully prosecuted.

v. Newell, ¶ 67, (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Morris, 215 Ariz. at 335 ¶ 46, 160 P.3d at 214 (“The misconduct must be ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” ( ¶ 26, )).

“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” ¶ 26, (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 340-41 ¶ 45, 111 P.3d at 382- 83 (requiring a showing that the misconduct likely denied the defendant a fair trial).

And, because it is the state‟s duty to “seek justice, not merely a conviction,” the probative features of such evidence cannot themselves be unduly prejudicial to the state.6 5 We discuss prejudice here as a separate concept from the risk of confusion.

“In order to constitute fundamental error, the prosecutor’s comment had to be so egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and to render the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” (prosecutorial misconduct must “‘so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process’”), quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).

“Prosecutorial misconduct is harmless error if we can find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” , see also Rutledge, , 66 P.3d at 56 (providing “improper comment on a defendant’s failure to testify can be harmless error”); , (prosecutor’s impermissible statement on defendant’s failure to testify harmles

Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” Harrod, 183 P.3d at 529

¶36 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” , quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 , 94 S.Ct.

“Fundamental error is that which is ‘clear, egregious, and curable only via a new trial.’ ” ¶ 62 , ( , ).

[T]he conduct [must] be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶ 152

¶ 26, (“To determine whether prosecutorial misconduct permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial, the court necessarily has to recognize the cumulative effect of the misconduct.” (emphasis added)).

¶ 26, (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor's misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26, (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

88, ¶¶ 50 & 74, 1200 (1998).