Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915.

306 citing documents.

State v. Womble 235 P.3d 244 Ariz. 2010
State v. Womble 235 P.3d 244 Ariz. 2010
P.3d 915 (2003) (Ring III).
State v. Villalobos 235 P.3d 227 Ariz. 2010
State v. Villalobos 235 P.3d 227 Ariz. 2010
State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
§ 13-751(F)(5), an aggravating circumstance exists if “[t]he defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.” Our inquiry is “highly fact- intensive.” ¶ 76
State v. Cropper 225 P.3d 579 Ariz. 2010
State v. Cropper 225 P.3d 579 Ariz. 2010
Sess.); see State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 13
State v. Soliz 219 P.3d 1045 Ariz. 2009
State v. Soliz 219 P.3d 1045 Ariz. 2009
Structural error, which “deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,” State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 45, (internal quotation marks omitted), requires no trial objection for reversal, Valverde, 220 Ariz. at 585 ¶ 10, 208 P.3d at 236.
State v. Freeney 219 P.3d 1039 Ariz. 2009
State v. Freeney 219 P.3d 1039 Ariz. 2009
State v. Forte 214 P.3d 1030 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Distinguished State v. Forte 214 P.3d 1030 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
But we disagree with Forte that such an error “unfairly ‘depriveLs] defendants of basic protections’ ” and is properly categorized as “structural.” n. 6 , , 1013 n. 6 (2007), , (alteration in Garza).
State v. Escobedo 213 P.3d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Escobedo 213 P.3d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Henley, , ¶ 21 , , ¶ 10 , and as “structural error,” ¶¶ 21-22 , State v. Ring (Ring III), -66, ¶¶ 106-07 , -47 (2003) (Feldman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
See State v. Ring (Ring III), -61 ¶¶ 80-81, -42 (2003).
State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
This Court rejected this argument in State v. Ring (Ring III), -47, ¶¶ 15-24, -28 (2003).
State v. Valverde 208 P.3d 233 Ariz. 2009
State v. Valverde 208 P.3d 233 Ariz. 2009
¶10 Structural error “deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,” State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 45, (internal quotation marks omitted), and “therefore is limited to such circumstances as denial of counsel or a biased [trier or fact],” n.6 ¶ 20, n.6 (2007).2 If an appellate court
State v. Freeney 207 P.3d 688 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
Accordingly, it does “not resemble the type of after-the-fact legislative evil contemplated by contemporary understandings of the ex post facto doctrine.” State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 23
State v. Nichols 195 P.3d 207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Nichols 195 P.3d 207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Although “the Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury, rather than a judge, make Enmund-Tison findings,” , the state conceded in previous proceedings in this case that a defendant is entitled to have a jury make those findings under Arizona’s statutory scheme.
State of Arizona v. Scott Douglas Nordstrom Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Scott Douglas Nordstrom Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Although “the Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury, rather than a judge, make Enmund-Tison findings,” the state conceded in previous proceedings in this case that a defendant is entitled to have a jury make those findings under Arizona’s statutory scheme.
State v. Wallace 191 P.3d 164 Ariz. 2008
State v. Wallace 191 P.3d 164 Ariz. 2008
State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
¶77 In State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 23, we held that “Arizona’s change in the statutory method for imposing capital punishment is clearly procedural” and does “not resemble the type of after-the-fact legislative evil contemplated by contemporary understandings of the ex post facto doctrine.
State v. Fischer 199 P.3d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Fischer 199 P.3d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
¶ 16 Finally, “[w]e cannot ignore a Supreme Court decision interpreting federal law unless the Court expressly overrules or easts cognizable doubt on that decision.” ¶ 61
State v. Armstrong 189 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2008
State v. Armstrong 189 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2008
State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 80
State v. Anthony 189 P.3d 366 Ariz. 2008
State v. Anthony 189 P.3d 366 Ariz. 2008
State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
890 (2008) (“To establish the (F)(5) aggravator, ‘the state must prove that the murder would not have occurred but for the defendant’s pecuniary motive.’”) (quoting State v. Ring (Ring III), 204 Ariz. 534, 560, ¶ 75, ).
State v. Boggs 185 P.3d 111 Ariz. 2008
State v. Boggs 185 P.3d 111 Ariz. 2008
State v. Price 183 P.3d 1279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Price 183 P.3d 1279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
¶¶ 106-07 , -47 (2003) (Feldman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing trial to insufficient number of jurors as structural error).
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
This Court rejected this argument in State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 23