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we automatically reverse the guilty verdict.” ¶ 45 (2003).

But some trial errors are so profound that they “deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,” and whenever such an error occurs, “no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” ¶ 45 (2003) (citation omitted and cleaned up).

¶¶ 45–46 (2003) (denying a criminal defendant any opportunity to present a defense is structural error requiring reversal).

(“The Sixth Amendment assigns to the jury responsibility for determining whether all statutory criminal elements exist.”).

“Structural error is a narrow category” of trial error that “’deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.’” ¶ 16 (App. 2024) ( ¶ 45 (2003)).

¶¶ 45-46 (2003) (listing types of structural error).

23, 2025) (vacating ¶¶ 9–23 of the court of appeals’ opinion); –53, ¶ 46 (2003) (noting “complete denial of criminal defense counsel” as one recognized form of structural error).

Structural error is a narrow category reflecting error that “deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” and in the face of which “no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” ¶ 45 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999)); –24, ¶ 22 (2000) (structural errors “create ‘defects .

In fact, excusing a juror because of his “views on capital punishment” is structural error that requires reversal, ¶ 46 (2003), unless the juror is “irrevocably committed” to vote for or against the death penalty “regardless of the facts and circumstances,” Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968)); see also Morgan, 504 U.S. at

) (failure to develop and support argument results in 4We reject Bourke’s contention that the presiding judge’s alleged bias “constitutes structural error.” In criminal cases, structural error is error that “deprive[s] defendants of ‘basic protections’ without which ‘a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.’” (quoting Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999)).

Structural error has been found in relatively few circumstances, relevant among them, where there is a “complete denial of criminal defense counsel” or “denial of access to criminal defense counsel during an overnight trial recess.” 3 ¶10 A defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by both “the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 24, of the Arizona Constitution.” see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807.

Structural errors require reversal because they “infect[] ‘the entire trial process’ from beginning to end.” ¶ 46 (2003) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).

(structural error “automatically” results in reversal of guilty verdict); (“Where error is structural, prejudice is presumed and reversal is mandated regardless of whether an objection [wa]s made below.”).

–60, ¶ 74 (2003) (“[T]he age of the victim can be implicit in the verdict, if the jury simultaneously convicts the defendant of an offense that 8 STATE v. SCHMITZ Decision of the Court includes the age of the [] victim

(Section 13-118’s requirement that state prove sexual motivation beyond reasonable doubt “akin to an element of an aggravated offense”); (when “defendant stipulates, confesses or admits to facts sufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance, we will regard that factor as established”).

¶ 93 (2003) (“In cases in which a defendant stipulates, confesses or admits to facts sufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance, [the court] will regard that factor as established.”).

and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.’” ¶ 45 (2003) (citation omitted).

¶ 87 (2005) (holding that "use of a second jury during the aggravation and penalty phases does not constitute double jeopardy"); ¶ 27 (2003) (noting that, except for in capital sentencing proceedings, "[d]ouble jeopardy principles generally do not apply to sentencing proceedings") (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980)).

regard error as structural” are those that “deprive defendants of basic protections and infect the entire trial process from beginning to end.” ¶ 66 (2018) (internal quotation marks 29 STATE V. SMITH Opinion of the Court omitted) ( ¶ 45 (2003)).

1 “A capital trial comprises just one trial, divided into guilt and sentencing phases.” ¶ 50 n.19 (2003); see A.R.S.

Cf. Torres, 208 Ariz. at 343–44 ¶¶ 11–13 (holding that structural error applies to only a few enumerated situations and the harmless error standard applies to a trial judge’s summary denial of a motion to change counsel); see also State v. Ring (III), – 53 ¶ 46 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has defined relatively few instances in 2 Riley’s trial strategy dispute with Craig persisted after the trial court denied his motion for new counsel.