Cited by

§ 13-1406(B); –93 ¶¶ 17–18 (2000) (concluding that sentencing factors do not constitute an element of an offense).

¶ 7 (2000) (noting that where an ambiguity exists, the title of a statute may be used to aid in its interpretation).

Repucci makes no effort to explain how a person in her circumstances reasonably could have believed Officer Anderson’s wrist grab amounted to the imminent commission of: (1) “a knowing restraint coupled with one or more of the specifically listed intentions,” ¶ 7 (2000), thereby constituting kidnapping under A.R.S.

Article II, § 10 of the Arizona Constitution “is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause,” Jurden, n.1, and we thus analyze claims under each identically

§ 13-105(39)(defining “serious physical injury”); ¶ 6 (2000) (“In deciding whether a defendant has been punished twice for the same offense, it is necessary to examine the elements of the crimes for which the individual was sentenced and determine ‘whether each [offense] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.’”) (alteration in original)

The analysis under both the federal and state constitutions is the same because the language is virtually identical and “the two clauses have been held to grant the same protection to criminal defendants.” ¶ 5 (2000).

V; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10; ¶ 5 (2000) (federal and Arizona double jeopardy clauses generally provide the same protections).

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); ¶ 6 (2000).

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); ¶ 6 (2000).

¶ 7 (2000) (noting that where an ambiguity exists, the title of a statute may be used to aid in its interpretation, although headings are not part of the law itself).

State v. Eagle , , ¶ 5, , 397 (2000).

See State v. Eagle , , ¶ 6, ("[W]hen statutes describe different offenses, consecutive sentences are permissible without implicating the prohibition against double jeopardy"); see also A.R.S.

¶14 “The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense.” ¶ 6 (2000).

V; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10; ¶ 5 (2000) (federal and Arizona Double Jeopardy Clauses generally provide same protections).

¶ 6, see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980).1 The protection against double jeopardy may be triggered in two contexts.

¶¶ 9-11, KANIOWSKY v. PIMA CTY.

¶ 6 (2000) (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980)).

2536, 2540 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984); ¶ 6 , (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 , 100 S.Ct.

“[W]hen statutes describe different offenses, consecutive sentences are permissible without implicating the prohibition against double jeopardy.” State v. (Shawnte) Jones, ¶ 13, ( ¶ 6, ) (holding double jeopardy not violated by felony-murder charge and underlying child-abuse charge); see also Siddle, 202 Ariz. at 517 ¶¶ 13, 15, 47 P.3d at 1155 (recognizing that “[f]elony murder and the predicate felony are distinct crimes and may be punished separately in a single t

§ 13-1304 defines single offense of kidnapping that might be committed with more than one purpose or intent, and defendant was not denied unanimous jury verdict even though jurors might not have agreed on the intent with which he committed the kidnapping); ¶ 7, (“Subsection (A) of the text completely defines the crime of kidnapping as it exists in Arizona.

¶ 5, (recognizing that “the two clauses have been held to grant the same protection to criminal defendants” (citations omitted)); but see Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108-09, 677 P.2d at 271-72 (recognizing the general rule but declining to rely on the federal interpretation in light of a mistrial

V; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10; ¶ 5, (federal and Arizona Double Jeopardy Clauses generally provide same protections).