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Gastelum argues “[t]he fairness and impartiality of juries are fundamental to the integrity of the legal system,” and that accordingly, “empaneling of a biased juror is a structural error that affects the integrity of the legal system.” a capital case in which the trial court excluded jurors for cause who voiced objections to the death penalty; the court did not allow additional voir dire of these jurors, and our supreme court reversed.

Further, “the court can dismiss [prospective] jurors based on questionnaire responses, particularly if neither party objects nor seeks further questioning.” State v. Lucas, __ Ariz. __, __, ¶ 28 (App. 2025) ()2; ¶ 24 (2000).

s of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” and in the face of which “no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” ¶ 45 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999)); –24, ¶ 22 (2000) (structural errors “create ‘defects .

See Ring, 204 Ariz. at 552 ¶ 46; ¶ 23 & n.5 (2000).

See State v. Davolt , , 201-05, ¶¶ 21-34, , 466-67 (2004) (applying Arizona and federal law to a search conducted in California); State v. Anderson , , 326, ¶ 34, , 381 (2000) (declining to apply Arizona initial appearance rule to time spent in custody in Illinois).

¶35 In addition, Sanders’ reliance on State v. Anderson (Anderson I), –24 ¶ 22 (2000), is misplaced.

State v. Anderson ( Anderson I ), , on which Bush relies, is inapposite.

Such errors are very limited in nature and number inasmuch as they “affect the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, and thus taint the framework within which the trial proceeds.” ¶ 12, (internal quotation marks omitted) ( ¶ 22, ).

In other words, structural errors are those that “affect the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, and thus taint the framework within which the trial proceeds.” ¶ 12, (internal quotation marks omitted) ( ¶ 22, ).

¶12 Harris contends the prosecutor’s statements improperly conditioned the jury and amounted to structural error.4 (“It is not a legitimate function of voir dire to condition the jury to the receipt of certain evidence or to a

8 State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo Opinion of the Court “Naranjo does not identify any questions he was prevented from asking jurors during oral voir dire.” ¶27 This case is not like State v. Anderson (Anderson I), P.3d 369 (2000).

¶31 “[T]he Sixth Amendment is violated if the trial jury in a capital case is chosen by excluding for cause persons who have general objections to the death penalty.” State v. Anderson (Anderson I), ¶ 6

¶14 A week after dismissing Juror 74, the court informed counsel that it wanted to bring her in for questioning in light of State v. Anderson (Anderson I), ¶ 23

¶26 Jurors cannot be excluded “simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968); accord State v. Anderson (Anderson I), ¶ 23

Our cases have referred to this error both as “fundamental error,” , ¶ 21 , , ¶ 10 , and as “structural error,” ¶¶ 21-22 , State v. Ring (Ring III), -66, ¶¶ 106-07 , -47 (2003) (Feldman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

A judge, however, is required to question jurors regarding their opinions on the death penalty, see, e.g., State v. Anderson (Anderson I), -19 ¶¶ 7-10, -74 (2000), and, after attempting rehabilitation, must remove a potential juror from the jury pool if the juror’s personal views may “prevent or substantially impair the performance of [the juror’s] duties.”

Jurors cannot be dismissed for cause “simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) (finding Sixth Amendment violation); see also State v. Anderson (Anderson I), ¶ 23 & n.5, & n.5 (2000) (finding violation of Ariz. R. Crim.

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)); State v. Anderson (Anderson I), -19 ¶ 9, 373-74 (2000).

Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518; see also State v. Anderson (Anderson I), -19 ¶ 9, -74 (2000).

¶66 A structural error is one that “affect[s] the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, and thus taint[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds.” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 565 ¶ 12, 115 P.3d at 605 (quoting State v. Anderson (Anderson I), ¶ 22, (internal quotations omitted)).

Error is structural only when it creates “defects in the trial mechanism” and thus affects the “entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end.” ¶ 22 , (citation omitted).

To serve as a basis for exclusion, the juror’s views must “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, - 7 - 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)); see also State v. Anderson (Anderson I), -19, ¶ 9, -74 (2000).