Cited by

In 2 STATE v. SATZMAN Decision of the Court evaluating potential jurors’ fairness and impartiality, “the trial court has the best opportunity to observe potential jurors and thereby judge their credibility.” ¶ 37 (2000) (citations omitted).

“We will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence without a ‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted.” -43, ¶ 57, -13 (2000) ( ).

¶ 75, abrogation on other grounds recognized by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 815-17 (9th Cir. 2015).

¶ 50 (2007) (citation and quotation omitted) (stating “a defendant who invited error at trial may not then assign the same as error on appeal”); -37, ¶ 24 (2000) (citation omitted) (“Even assuming a Miranda violation, non-reference to the statements at trial renders defendant’s Miranda objections moot.”).

Court has “repeatedly held” that “the death penalty should not be imposed in every capital murder case but, rather, it should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime ‘above the norm of first-degree murders.’” ¶ 45, ( ¶ 169, ).

¶ 66, (admission of improper testimony by detective regarding witness’s statements constituted harmless error when statements were also included in witness’s own testimony and witness was subjected to thorough cross-examination) (citation omitted).

“A police officer has probable cause when reasonably trustworthy information and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense.” , ¶ 30, , 1007-08 (2000).

-78, ¶ 22, -87 (2000) (collecting cases holding overwhelming evidence of guilt renders evidentiary error harmless); -43, ¶¶ 57-58, -13 (2000) (finding “strong circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt” rendered other-act evidence harmless).

A trial court’s decision to deny a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and we “‘will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence’ unless there is a ‘reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted.’” Dann, 205 Ariz. at 570, ¶¶ 43-44 (- 43, ¶ 57 (2000)).

¶ 75, (stating the trial court is not required to give a proposed jury instruction if its substance is adequately covered by other instructions).

Because the jury, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, ¶ 97, (citation omitted); 2 At the time of this offense, Porras was on probation in CR 2005-006245.

¶ 6 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 52 (2000)).

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion and reverse only where there is a “‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the [error not occurred].” –43, ¶ 57 (2000) (citation omitted).

¶ 69, supplemented, P.3d 953 (2003) (noting “all references to polygraph tests, absent stipulation, are inadmissible for any purpose in Arizona”); (stating the evidence of, or reference to, a polygraph test i

Prejudice results and the conviction will be reversed if there is “a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted.” ¶ 57 (2000) (citation omitted).

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion and reverse only where there is a “‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the [improper] evidence not been admitted.” –43, ¶ 57 (2000) (citation omitted).

“A police officer has probable cause when reasonably trustworthy information and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense.” -38, ¶ 30 (2000), vacated in part on other grounds.

b. Killer unknown ¶87 “[P]articipation in a crime may be considered as mitigation where a defendant demonstrates that while he was legally accountable for the conduct of another, his participation in the crime was relatively minor.” ¶ 100, supplemented P.3d 953 (2003).

¶ 66 (2000) (concluding that any error in admitting a witness’s prior consistent statements was harmless when they were included in witness’s testimony and the witness was thoroughly cross–examined).

¶ 37, (“In assessing a .

¶ 66, (officer testifying to witness’ statements harmless error because all statements included in witness’ own testimony and witness subject to thorough cross-examination); ¶ 35, (Erroneous admission of entirely cumulati

at 119 , 516 P.2d at 61 (probable cause for arrest and search generally equivalent); , -08 (2000) ("A police officer has probable cause when reasonably trustworthy information and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense.”).

troduce the fact that the State’s agents hooked him up to a machine, told him that he was taking a polygraph examination, and told him that he failed the examination after claiming he had not committed the alleged acts.” The superior court initially precluded any mention of the CVSA during trial, ¶ 69

The determination turns on the specific facts and totality of circumstances involved, see Fornof, 179 P.3d at 956 (reasonable suspicion inquiry is fact specific), and the trial court’s assessment of the basis for and credibility of such testimony, (trial court in best position to evaluate witness credibility and weigh evidence).

We will not reverse a trial court’s denial of a mistrial “unless there is a ‘reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the [improper] evidence not been admitted.’ ” Dann, , 74 P.3d at 244

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion, id., and reverse only where there is a “’reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the [improper] evidence not been admitted.” –43, ¶ 57, –13 (2000) ( ).

¶13 Indeed, the state’s contention is inconsistent with our supreme court’s -09 (2000), which involved the use of a show-up identification of an individual suspected of kidnapping an eighteen- year-old girl.

See, ¶ 34, (identification made at show-up almost twelve hours after first encounter was fully reliable); (ten days between witness and subsequent identification does not necessarily render identification unreliable).

This court reviews the adequacy of jury instructions in their entirety to determine if they accurately reflect the law, ¶ 75, recognizing that “[c]losing arguments of counsel may be taken into account when assessing the adequacy of jury instructions,” (citation omitted).

See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); ¶ 86

5 Hoskins, -08 (2000), vacated in part on other grounds

¶29 But the decision to deny a mistrial rests with the discretion of the trial court, and “[w]e will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence without a ‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different 19 had the evidence not been admitted.” -13 (2000).

“In assessing a potential juror‟s fairness and impartiality, the trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and thereby judge the credibility of each.”

See LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 29, 734 P.2d at 571

“In assessing the adequacy of jury instructions, the instructions must be viewed in their entirety in order to determine whether they accurately reflect the law.” 145 ¶ 75