Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Robertson v. Motor Cargo, Inc., 14 P.3d 997.

128 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Danny Louis Musgrove Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
However, a court need not give an instruction that is covered adequately by other instructions, and should reject a “proffered jury instruction that misstates the law or has the potential to mislead or confuse the jury.”
State v. McKenna 214 P.3d 1037 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
12 defendant’s argument that he was denied an impartial and representative jury by the trial judge’s decision to death qualify the jurors and declining to revisit earlier holdings upholding the constitutionality of death qualification of juries); ¶¶ 49-50, (rejecting, pre-Ring, defendant’s claim that death qualification of jurors violates due process).
State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
See, ¶¶ 83-84, -42 ¶¶ 49-50, -12 (2000).
State v. Boggs 185 P.3d 111 Ariz. 2008
¶ 87, (“When a robbery victim is executed to facilitate the killer’s escape and hinder detection for the purpose of successfully procuring something of value, the pecuniary
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Rios 172 P.3d 844 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Andriano 161 P.3d 540 Ariz. 2007
hat “the death penalty should not be imposed in every capital murder case but, rather, it should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime ‘above the norm of first-degree murders.’” ¶ 45, ( ¶ 169, ).
State of Arizona v. William Gomez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
“[W]hen the substance of a proposed instruction is adequately covered by other instructions, the trial court is not required to give it.”
State of Arizona v. Renee Sue Ruggiero Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
Instead, Glassel’s proposed inquiry was to elicit each panelist’s understanding of the phrase “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” But, as we have noted, the phrase is “inherently subjective” and not the equivalent of a “mathematical formula.” ¶ 123
State of Arizona v. Oscar Manuel Lopez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
And “when the substance of a proposed instruction is ad equately cov ered by othe r instructions, th e trial court is not required to give it.” 1015 (200 0).
State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
E.g., State v. Montaño, ¶ 36 , (-42, ¶ 50 , -12 (2000)); ¶ 24 , ¶ 22
State of Arizona v. John William Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
127 , ¶ 30, -08 (200 0).
State v. Keener 75 P.3d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Probable cause derives from “reasonably trustworthy information and circumstances [that] would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense.” -38, ¶ 30 , -08 (2000), supp’l opin.
State v. Dann 74 P.3d 231 Ariz. 2003
404(b), courts “will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence” unless there is a “ ‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted.” -43, ¶ 57 , -13 (2000) ( , ).
State v. Hickman 68 P.3d 418 Ariz. 2003
State v. Davis 68 P.3d 127 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
-44, ¶¶ 59-64 , -15 (2000) (applying hearsay rules to third party culpability evidence).
State v. Rutledge 66 P.3d 50 Ariz. 2003
¶ 15 We review whether the trial court erred in denying Rutledge’s motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, ¶ 53 , and we review the trial court’s determination of the relevancy and admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.
State v. Montaño 65 P.3d 61 Ariz. 2003
State v. Prince 61 P.3d 450 Ariz. 2003
¶ 9 We have stated that jury instructions “must be viewed in their entirety in order to determine whether they accurately reflect the law.” ¶ 75
State v. Jones 49 P.3d 273 Ariz. 2002
2906, 2913-14 (1987); -42 ¶¶ 49-50, -12 ¶¶ 49-50 (2000).
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
¶ 45 As we have repeatedly held, the death penalty should not be imposed in every capital murder case but, rather, it should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime “above the norm of first-degree murders.” , 163 ¶ 169, , 1033 ¶ 169 (2000) ( , ); -69 , -28 (1983) (“either the circumstances of the killing are so shocking ...
State v. Finch 46 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2002
See generally Walton, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990); ¶ 84, ¶ 84.
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
See, , , 1017 ¶ 87 (2000) (“When a robbery victim is executed to facilitate the Mller’s escape and hinder detection for the purpose of successfully procuring something of value, the pecuniary gain motive is present.”); , (even if committed after
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
See, ¶87 (2000) (“When a robbery victim is executed to facilitate the killer's escape and hinder 49 detection for the purpose of successfully procuring something of value, the pecuniary gain motive is present.”); 775 P
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
See Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 165 , 823 P.2d at 32 ; , 137 ¶87, , 1017 ¶ 87 (2000) (finding F.5 present “[w]hen a robbery victim is executed to facilitate the killer’s escape and hinder detection for the purpose of successfully procuring something of value”).