Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Gusler v. Wilkinson, 18 P.3d 702.

26 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Anthony Eugene Searight Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2026
State of Arizona v. Anthony Eugene Searight Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2026
-33 (1969) (Arizona law permits inconsistent verdicts); (same).
Medina v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Medina v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Felix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Felix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State of Arizona v. Philip John Martin 446 P.3d 806 Ariz. 2019
State of Arizona v. Philip John Martin 446 P.3d 806 Ariz. 2019
See Gusler v. Wilkinson , , 394-95 ¶¶ 17-18, , 705-06 (2001) (requiring that the state demonstrate "manifest necessity" to overcome the defendant's right to have his fate decided by the impaneled jury).
State v. Hanson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Hanson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
of Maricopa, ¶ 25 (2001).
State v. Martin 424 P.3d 443 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Martin 424 P.3d 443 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
of Maricopa , , ; and State v. Espinoza
State v. Suazo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Suazo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Wyninger Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Wyninger Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
“[C]onsistency between the verdicts on the several counts of an indictment is unnecessary.” ¶ 25 (2001) (“Well-settled Arizona law permits inconsistent verdicts.”).
State of Arizona v. Tywan Demetrius Woods 348 P.3d 910 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Tywan Demetrius Woods 348 P.3d 910 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
“[T]he state ‘must demonstrate manifest necessity for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant,’ and the burden ‘is a heavy one.’ ” , quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 , 98 S.Ct.
State of Arizona v. Austin Garrett Hansen 345 P.3d 116 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Austin Garrett Hansen 345 P.3d 116 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
e.g., Webb, 186 Ariz. at 561 , 925 P.2d at 702 (defendant acquitted of felony DUI but convicted of DUI and driving without license); -16 , -77 (App.1992) (defendant convicted
State of Arizona v. Shiloe Dominique Espinoza 310 P.3d 52 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Shiloe Dominique Espinoza 310 P.3d 52 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
As our supreme court has explained, when a mistrial is granted because the jury has reached an impasse, “a defendant’s right to have a particular jury decide his fate becomes ‘subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury.’” quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
State of Arizona v. Higinio Aguilar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Higinio Aguilar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
And, our own supreme court stated that the prosecutor’s “burden ‘is a heavy one.’ Indeed, the very term ‘manifest necessity’ emphasizes ‘the magnitude of the prosecutor’s burden.’” Id., quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S. Ct. at 830; see also Evans v. Abbey, 130 Ariz.
Lemke v. Rayes 141 P.3d 407 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Lemke v. Rayes 141 P.3d 407 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Collateral estoppel simply means “that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be relitigated between the same parties in any *241 future lawsuit.” -96, ¶ 24 , -07 (2001) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 90 S.Ct.