Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990.
- Shafer v. McCombs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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Shafer v. McCombs
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Although a plaintiff need not know all the facts to trigger accrual, he or she “must at least possess a minimum requisite of knowledge sufficient to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury.” ¶ 22 (2002) ( ¶ 32 (1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
- Wilson v. Drake Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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Wilson v. Drake
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶14 Wilson, counters that because Drake fraudulently concealed the cause of action, the statute of limitations is tolled until the claim is actually discovered.
- Kresock v. Depaoli Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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Kresock v. Depaoli
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 23 (2002) (quoting Doe, 191 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 36).
- Mertola, LLC v. Santos 390 P.3d 812 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- Mertola, LLC v. Santos 390 P.3d 812 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- Rainer v. Swift Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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Rainer v. Swift
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Although knowledge of all the underlying facts is not necessary, the plaintiff “must at least possess a minimum requisite of knowledge sufficient to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury.” ¶ 22 (2002) (citation omitted).
- Marc S. v. Robyn P./william P. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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Marc S. v. Robyn P./william P.
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 34 (2002) (holding that a statute of limitations for malpractice was tolled by the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the facts until the plaintiff knew or should have known of the concealed facts).6 ¶18 That is the case here.
- State v. Langston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- Stazenski v. Coughlin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- Stazenski v. Coughlin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- Albano v. SHEA HOMES LTD. PARTNERSHIP 254 P.3d 360 Ariz. 2011
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Albano v. SHEA HOMES LTD. PARTNERSHIP
254 P.3d 360
Ariz. 2011
See, e.g., Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 315-16 ¶¶ 20-23, -96 (2002).
- Marquette Venture Partners II v. Leonesio 254 P.3d 418 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
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Marquette Venture Partners II v. Leonesio
254 P.3d 418
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
¶ 17 , (“[I]t is often the rule that in such eases the question of accrual is for the jury.”); , (“[Determination of a claim’s accrual date usually is a question of fact----”); , 629
- Thompson v. Pima County 243 P.3d 1024 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
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Thompson v. Pima County
243 P.3d 1024
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
¶ 11 , our supreme court stated that for a cause of action to accrue, “it is not enough that a plaintiff comprehends a ‘what’; there must also be reason to connect the “what’ to a particular “who’ in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury migh
- Lee v. State 242 P.3d 175 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
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Lee v. State
242 P.3d 175
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
¶ 23 , (stating that "determinations of the time when discovery occurs and a cause of action accrues `are usually and necessarily questions of fact for the jury'" ( ¶ 32 , )); accord Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudenti
- ELM RETIREMENT CENTER, LP v. Callaway 246 P.3d 938 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
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ELM RETIREMENT CENTER, LP v. Callaway
246 P.3d 938
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
The discovery rule tolls limitations "until the plaintiff possesses a minimum knowledge sufficient to recognize that a `wrong occurred and caused injury.'" ¶ 57 , ( ¶ 22 , ).
- Little v. State 240 P.3d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
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Little v. State
240 P.3d 861
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
The relevant inquiry is when did a plaintiffs “ ‘knowledge, understanding, and acceptance in the aggregate provide[ ] sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.’”
- Porter v. Spader 239 P.3d 743 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
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Porter v. Spader
239 P.3d 743
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
4 See, ¶¶ 34-37 , Certainteed Corp. v. United Pac.
- Ritchie v. Krasner 211 P.3d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
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Ritchie v. Krasner
211 P.3d 1272
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Under this rule, the statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff possesses a minimum knowledge sufficient to recognize that “a wrong occurred and caused injury.” ¶ 22 , ( ¶ 32 , ).
- 1800 OCOTILLO, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc. 176 P.3d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
- 1800 OCOTILLO, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc. 176 P.3d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
- Dawson v. Withycombe 163 P.3d 1034 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
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Dawson v. Withycombe
163 P.3d 1034
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
See also In re McDonnell’s Estate, *108 , (difference between actual and constructive fraud is that former requires actual intent to deceive while other is characterized as breach of a duty actionable irrespective of moral guilt and arising out of a confidential relationship); , ¶ 35 and n. 6, , 999 and n. 6 (2002) (breach of fiduciary duty by fraudulently concealing treatment errors tolls statute of limitations until concealment is discovered or reasonably should be discovered or presumably unt
- Airfreight Express, Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Center, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
- Airfreight Express, Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Center, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
- Tyman v. Hintz Concrete, Inc. 148 P.3d 1146 Ariz. 2006
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Tyman v. Hintz Concrete, Inc.
148 P.3d 1146
Ariz. 2006
But this argument conflates the “discovery” rule for tolling the statute of limitations — under which the statute does not begin to run until a plaintiff could reasonably have discovered the identity of a responsible defendant, see Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 315-16 ¶¶ 20-23, -96 (2002) — with the mistake requirement of Rule 15(c)(2).
- Maher v. Urman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
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Maher v. Urman
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
§ 12- 542; P.3d 990 (2002).
- City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 78 P.3d 1056 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
- City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 78 P.3d 1056 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
- TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL v. Bernini 76 P.3d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
- TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL v. Bernini 76 P.3d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
- Hullett v. Cousin 63 P.3d 1029 Ariz. 2003
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Hullett v. Cousin
63 P.3d 1029
Ariz. 2003
¶ 30, (finding that determination of when cause of action accrues is ordinarily a question of fact).
- Althaus v. Penn-America Ins. Co. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
- Althaus v. Penn-America Ins. Co. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
- Glaze v. Larsen 55 P.3d 93 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002