Cited by

§ 12-821, which requires “all actions” against public entities or employees to be filed “within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” Determining when a cause of action accrues is usually a factual question for the jury, ¶ 23 (2002), but “it may be decided as a matter of law if the record shows when the plaintiff unquestionably [was] aware of the necessary facts underlying [his or her] cause of action,” –72, ¶ 7 (App. 2017) (citation modified).

Fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations until “such concealment is discovered, or reasonably should have been discovered.” ¶ 35 (2002) ().

However, a plaintiff “need not know all the facts underlying a cause of action to trigger accrual.” Satamian, 257 Ariz. at 170, ¶ 13 ( ¶ 22 (2002)).

B. Fraudulent Concealment ¶20 Aside from the standard discovery rule, Shamamian argues the fraudulent concealment rule tolls the statute of limitations for her claims, ¶ 34 (2002).

The facts underlying the cause include both the what and who elements of causation and are expected to be known only after a plaintiff has a reason to connect those two elements “in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might result from fault.” ¶ 22 (2002); accord Lawhon v. L.B.J.

The key question is whether a plaintiff “possess[es] a minimum requisite of knowledge sufficient to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury” and has “reason to connect the ‘what’ to a particular ‘who.’” ¶ 22 (2002) (emphasis omitted).

This inquiry turns on when the 6 LIBERTI v. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE Opinion of the Court plaintiff’s “knowledge, understanding, and acceptance in the aggregate provide[] sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.” ().

¶ 22 (2002) (noting, in the 9 OLIVAS, et al. v. YAVAPAI, et al. Decision of the Court days from that date, or until April 4, 2022, to either amend her deficient NOC or serve a new one that met statutory requirements.

¶12 A cause of action accrues when “a reasonable person would have been on notice to investigate.” ¶ 8 (App. 2017) ( ¶ 24 (2002)).

A plaintiff, however, “need not know all the facts underlying a cause of action to trigger accrual.” ¶ 22 (2002) 5 SATAMIAN V. GREAT DIVIDE Opinion of the Court (quoting Doe, 191 Ariz. at 323 ¶ 32).

Fraudulent concealment tolls the applicable limitations period “until such concealment is discovered, or reasonably should have been discovered.” ¶ 35 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The plaintiff need not know all of the underlying facts (or even the full extent of the injury), just enough “to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury” and to link that injury “to a particular ‘who.’” Doe, 191 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 32; ¶¶ 22–23 (2002); see also CDT, 198 Ariz. at 176–77, ¶ 11.

Co. of Am., (holding that a cause of action accrues when "the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying the cause"); ¶ 35 (2002) (holding that even if fraudulent concealment is established, "the statute of limitations is tolled [only] until such concealment is discovered, or reasonably should have been discovered" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Regardless, the superior court correctly concluded that Lamore’s claims were more than a decade late, because, given her admitted complaints to McKee in 1998 and to his firm in 2002, she “was on reasonable notice to investigate [McKee’s] alleged fault no later than 2002.” ¶ 24 (2002) (holding that, under discovery rule, statute begins to run when “a reasonable person would have been on notice to investigate.”); see also A.R.S.

( ¶¶ 23–24 (2002)) (explaining plaintiff need only understand that a wrong occurred and have a reason to connect that wrong to a “particular ‘who’ in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might result 5

Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows she has been injured and has a “reason to connect [the injury] to a particular [cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition] in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might result from fault.” ¶ 22 (2002); ¶ 29 (1998) (“A cause of action [accrues when] the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the cause.”) (emphasis add

A plaintiff must also have a “reason to connect the ‘what’ to a particular ‘who’ in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might result from fault.” ¶ 22 (2002).

316-17, ¶¶ 16, 25 (2002).

-47, ¶ 14 (App. 2010) (question of when cause of action accrued for purposes of § 12-821.01 usually one of fact unless relevant facts are undisputed); -15, ¶ 17 (2002) (same principle under common-law discovery rule).

Under that rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows he or she has been injured and has a “reason to connect [the injury] to a particular [cause, source, act, event, instrumentality, or condition] in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might result from fault.” ¶ 22 (2002) (emphasis added); ¶ 29 (1998) (“A cause of action [accrues when] the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the cause.”