Cited by

assum[e] that the legislature has said what it means.” ¶ 11 (2002).

See DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 83 (2011) (“[W]hen the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended.” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez– Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004))); ¶ 11 (2002) (noting presumption that “the legislature has said what it means”).

¶ 11 (2002) (stating that a reviewing court assumes “the legislature has said what it means”).

Supra ¶ 41; ¶ 11 n.5 (2002) (“We cannot be asked to guess at the legislature’s subjective intent.

When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not look beyond the language, but rather “simply ‘apply it without using other means of construction,’ assuming that the legislature has said what it means.” ¶ 11 (2002), quoting UNUM Life Ins.

When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not look beyond the language, but rather “simply apply it without using other means of construction, assuming that the legislature has said what it means.” ¶ 11 (2002) (citation and quotation omitted).

-50, ¶ 8 , (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); ¶ 11 , (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”).

(we assume legislature said what it means).

¶ 22 (App. 2007) ( ¶ 11 (2002)).

¶ 10 (App. 2008) ( ¶ 11 (2002)).

When the language of a statute is subject to more than one reasonable meaning, “we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and consider the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” ¶ 11 (2002) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

If the language is subject to more than one interpretation, “we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and consider the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” ¶ 11 , (quoting UNUM Life Ins.

If the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply that language “‘without using other means of construction.’” Id.

¶ 7 , (explaining that “we assume ‘the legislature has said what it means’ ”) ( ¶ 11 , ).

and unambiguous, we will “look no further.” Id.; see also City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., (when statutory language unambiguous “a court should not look beyond the language but rather ‘simply apply it without using other means of construction, assuming that the legislature has said what it means’”)

‗we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and 6 consider ―the statute‘s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.‖‘‖ quoting UNUM Life Ins.

Had the legislature intended the meaning proffered by La Vancha it clearly could have prohibited courts from funding a spousal maintenance award from title 38 benefits, and we assume “the legislature has said what it means.”

“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not look beyond the language, but rather „simply apply it without using other means of construction, assuming that the legislature has said what it means.‟” City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.

Co., ¶ 8 , ( ¶ 11 , ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

If, however, a statute is ambiguous or its meaning is unclear, “ ‘we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and consider the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.’ ” Ross, , 151 P.3d at 1264

In analyzing a statute, we attempt to give it meaning consistent with “the statutory scheme as a whole.” ¶ 22 , ( ¶ 11 , ).

But if the statutory language is ambiguous, “we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and consider the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” ¶ 11 , (citation and internal quotations omitted).

If the language is subject to more than one interpretation, “ “we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and consider the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.’ ” , quoting UNUM Life Ins.

If that language is ambiguous, “we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and consider the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” Ross, 214 Ariz. at 283, ¶ 22 , 151 P.3d at 1264 ( ¶ 11 , ).