Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Peak v. Acuna, 50 P.3d 833.

40 citing documents.

State v. Hunter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Hunter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
P. 20; ¶¶ 8-9 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 20 9 STATE v. HUNTER Decision of the Court (explaining that a trial court’s decision to set aside a verdict because it is against the weight o
State of Arizona v. Robert Fischer 392 P.3d 488 Ariz. 2017
State of Arizona v. Robert Fischer 392 P.3d 488 Ariz. 2017
For this reason, we disavow our contrary characterization of the trial court’s ¶ 9, (suggesting that a trial court may order a new trial based on a verdict that is contrary to the weight of the evidence when “the trial judge simply disagrees with the jury’s resolution of conflicting facts”).
State of Arizona v. Christepher E. Lua 350 P.3d 805 Ariz. 2015
State of Arizona v. Christepher E. Lua 350 P.3d 805 Ariz. 2015
In doing so, the court rejected Lua’s P.3d 833 (2002), “stands for the proposition that provocation manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.” Id.
State v. Valenzuela Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Valenzuela Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶12 Provocation manslaughter is an “unusual” lesser-included offense of second-degree murder because “[i]nstead of deleting an element of the greater offense, it specifies a different circumstance as a requirement to find the lesser offense.” ¶ 6
State of Arizona v. Austin Garrett Hansen 345 P.3d 116 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Austin Garrett Hansen 345 P.3d 116 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
if one has not committed the lesser offense, one cannot have committed the greater,” , and "the extra element distinguishing the lesser included offense of assault from the greater offense, aggravated assault, is the use of a deadly weapon.”
In Re Dillon D. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
In Re Dillon D. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Therefore, double jeopardy precludes retrial.” ¶ 8
State v. Raimonde Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Raimonde Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Heat-of-passion manslaughter admittedly is an unusual type of lesser included offense in that “[i]nstead of deleting an element of the greater offense, it specifies a different circumstance as a requirement to find the lesser offense,” that is, the commission of second-degree murder “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim.” ¶¶ 5-6, A.R.S.
State of Arizona v. Adolfo Noel Ruiz, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Adolfo Noel Ruiz, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
(lesser offense of manslaughter by sudden quarrel/heat of passion includes all elements of greater offense of second-degree murder plus different required circumstance).
State v. Jarrett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Jarrett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
See Peak v. Acuña, -85, ¶ 6, - 35 (2002) (referring to “sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim” in A.R.S.
State of Arizona v. Shiloe Dominique Espinoza 310 P.3d 52 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Shiloe Dominique Espinoza 310 P.3d 52 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
See, e.g., Peak v. Acuña, 50 5 STATE v. ESPINOZA Opinion of the Court P.3d 833, 835 (2002).
State of Arizona v. William Peter Moran 307 P.3d 95 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. William Peter Moran 307 P.3d 95 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
See Peak v. Acuña, (reversal based on insufficient evidence “is, in effect, an implied acquittal” that “precludes retrial”).
State of Arizona v. Xavier Hipolito Estrella 286 P.3d 150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Xavier Hipolito Estrella 286 P.3d 150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
4 ¶ 17 “A lesser-included offense is one that contains all but one of the elements of the greater offense.”
McBride v. KIECKHEFER ASSOCIATES, INC. 265 P.3d 1061 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
McBride v. KIECKHEFER ASSOCIATES, INC. 265 P.3d 1061 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
¶ 9 , ¶ 23 , Reeves, 119 Ariz. at 163 , 579 P.2d at 1386 ; , Lyle v. Boyle, 16 Ariz.App.
State v. West 250 P.3d 1188 Ariz. 2011
State v. West 250 P.3d 1188 Ariz. 2011
(contrasting applicable standards for motions under Rule 20 and Rule 24.1); ¶ 9, (in ruling on a motion for new trial, judge acts as a “so-called thirteenth juror” and may grant motion if he “simply disagrees with the jury’s resolution of conflicting facts” and “believes the conviction is against the weight of the evidence”).
State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
See Peak v. Acuña, ¶¶ 5-6, -35 (2002) (holding heat-of-passion manslaughter not lesser-included offense of second-degree murder for double jeopardy purposes).
State of Arizona v. Jeffrey Lee Hinden Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. Jeffrey Lee Hinden Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
n.1, n.1 (App. 2004); (“When a conviction is reversed for insufficiency of evidence, the reversal is, in effect, an implied acquittal of the charges.
State of Arizona v. Robert Carlos Garcia Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Robert Carlos Garcia Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Garfield 92 P.3d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Garfield 92 P.3d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
(when appellate court reverses conviction for insufficient evidence, double jeopardy prevents retrial).
State v. Wilson 82 P.3d 797 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Wilson 82 P.3d 797 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Ring 65 P.3d 915 Ariz. 2003
State v. Ring 65 P.3d 915 Ariz. 2003
at 1857, 1861 ; , 85 ¶ 8, (stating implied acquittal exists where appellate court reverses conviction for insufficiency of evidence and double jeopardy precludes retrial).