Cited by

of Regents, ¶ 17 (2020) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the value to the rule of consistency, continuity, and predictability.”); ¶ 16 (2003) (stating stare decisis “seeks to promote reliability so that parties can plan activities knowing what the law is”).

of Regents, ¶ 17 (2020); ¶ 16 (2003) (“[S]tare decisis .

A prior decision involving statutory interpretation is afforded greater deference because, if we construe “the statute other than as the legislature intended, the legislature retains the power to correct us.” ¶ 17 (2003).

¶ 16 (2003) (“[S]tare decisis .

(“[I]f the court interprets the statute other than as the legislature intended, the legislature retains the power to correct us.”).

Legislative Acquiescence ¶ 17 Arizona courts recognize that “[i]f the legislature amends a statute after it has been judicially construed, but does not modify the statute in a manner that changes the court’s interpretation, we presume the legislature approved of the court’s construction and intended that it remain a part of the statute.” ¶ 17

-57, ¶¶ 17, 18 , -28 (2003) (“If the legislature amends a statute after it has been judicially construed, but does not modify the statute in a manner that changes the court’s interpretation, we presume the legislature approved of the court’s construction and intended that it remain a part of the stat

¶ 17 , (“If the legislature amends a statute after it has been judicially construed, but does not modify the statute in a manner that changes the court’s interpretation, we presume the legislature approved of the court’s construction and intended that it remain a part of the statute.”).

See id., 211 Ariz. at 80 n. 3, ¶ 17, 117 P.3d at 799 n. 3; Galloway v. Vanderpool, *286 ¶ 17 , (“Once published, our interpretation [of a statute] becomes part of the statute.”).

¶ 19, (recognizing that Legislature can amend statutes and is an “appropriate forum to argue that public policy considerations favor abandoning the rule announced” in prior court decisions).

¶26 “[E]ven those who regard ‘stare decisis’ with something less than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has even greater weight where the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute.” ¶ 16, (quoting Walker v. Walker, 178 S.E.2d 46, 46 (Ga.

8 If this decision does not interpret § 12-962 as the legislature intended, we note that the “‘legislature retains the power to correct us.’”

But to the extent this opinion may not correctly interpret either § 11-251.05 or § 11-251.08 as the legislature intended, we clearly acknowledge “ ‘the legislature retains the power to correct us.’ ”

But to the extent this opinion may not correctly interpret either § 11-251.05 or § 11-251.08 as the legislature intended, we clearly acknowledge “‘the legislature retains the power to correct us.’”

The Farias did not argue below that their business 3 To the extent this decision does not interpret §§ 11-821.01 and 11-830 as the legislature intended, we note that the “‘legislature retains the power to correct us.’”

Gomm’n, , (“This court must follow supreme court authority.”); ¶ 22 , (“The strength of [the stare decisis] doctrine is at its apex ‘when prior decisions construe a statute.’”) ( ¶ 16 , ).

“The doctrine of stare decisis, which requires us to give weight to previous decisions addressing the same issue, seeks to promote reliability so that parties can plan activities knowing what the law is.” Galloway - 24 - v. Vanderpool, ¶ 16, (McGregor, J.).

their rights are as set out by judicial precedent and having relied on such rights in conducting their affairs should not have them done away with by judicial fiat.’” ¶ 33, (quoting White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113, -14 (1961)); ¶ 16, (“The doctrine of stare decisis .

“Once published, our interpretation becomes part of the statute.” ¶ 17

(“The legislature, of course, can amend the workers’ compensation statutes .