Cited by

Because “[a] vacated judgment lacks force or effect[,]” ¶ 12 (2003), we cannot rely on the August 2025 order to satisfy the required first step of finding at least one statutory ground proven by clear and convincing evidence, In re E.C., 261 Ariz. at 5 ¶¶ 19–20.

If a new trial is granted on all issues, then the final judgment is vacated in its entirety, ¶ 1 (2003) (“[A]n order granting a new trial vacates the original entry of judgment .

“We review issues of law de novo,” ¶ 5 (2003), but “sustain the superior court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,” ¶ 20 (App. 2021) (as amended).

¶ 26 (App. 2011) (noting that upon remand, a trial court normally has the power to determine attorneys' fees questions and express direction in the mandate is not required for the trial court to award fees); ¶ 12 (2003) ("A vacated judgment lacks force or effect and places parties in the position they occupied before entry of the judgment.").

¶ 12 (2003) (“A vacated judgment lacks force or effect and places parties in the position they occupied before entry of the judgment.”).

¶8 P.3d 911 (2003) as authority for his argument that Judge Ryan could not rely on Judge Hicks’s findings.

P. 59(a) (court may vacate judgment and grant new trial on motion of aggrieved party); (order granting new trial vacates original entry of judgment).

where no cross-appeal was required because the superior court had entered an order entirely in appellees' favor.

¶ 11 , (“It has long been the rule in Arizona that a valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract.”); see also Holland v. Roeser, 37 F.3d 501, 504 (9th Cir.1994) (interpreting an offer of judgment as a contract); ¶ 5 , (interpreting the rules of procedure in the same manner as statutes).

("vacated judgment lacks force or effect and places parties in the position they occupied before entry of the judgment").

¶ 5 , (interpreting the rules of procedure in the same manner as statutes); State ex rel.

This power includes the “authority to interpret rules of procedure.” ¶ 5

Falcon, 212 Ariz. at 148, ¶ 16 , 128 P.3d at 771 ( ¶ 13 , (suggesting that courts should not construe ambiguous rules of civil procedure restrietively)).

(applying rules of statutory construction to interpret ambiguous procedural rules).

See Forino v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., , (“To discern the legislature’s intent, we may consider the effect and consequences of alternative construction.”); ¶ 5 , (holding rules of procedure interpreted in same manner as statutes).

¶ 5, (approving de novo review of legal issues).

¶ 5, (approving de novo review of legal issues).