Cited by

In construing the subject statutes, we give every word and phrase its “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” -65, ¶ 11, STATE v RANDLES Opinion of the Court 271-72 (2003) ( ).

¶ 11, (plain language of a statute controls if it is clear and would not lead to impossible or absurd results).

When interpreting a statute, our goal is to “fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.” , 464 ¶ 11

We must also give effect to each word or phrase and apply the “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. *505 462, 464-65, ¶ 11 , -72 (2003) ( , ).

“The court’s chief goal in interpreting a statute is ‘to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.’ ” ¶ 11 , ( , ).

v. Hayden, 6 MacKinney submitted in this court a request to file an addendum to his answering brief in which he points to an acknowledgement by the city in response to his requests for admissions that a portion of green-fees revenue is used for advertising purposes, and argues for the fir

§ 12-2101(A)(6), the superior court must expressly direct “that the only issue remaining is the amount of recovery.” ¶ 28

§ 12-2101(A)(6) P.3d 269 (2003).

¶ 5 When interpreting a statute, our goal is “ ‘to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.’”

Not project a glaring or dazzling light.” ¶6 “The court‟s chief goal in interpreting a statute is „to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.‟”

We follow the plain language “unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results.” ¶ 11

¶ 11 Our goal when interpreting a statute is “to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.” ¶ 11 , (quoting Hayes v. Cont’l Ins.

Thus, we are presented with a question of statutory interpretation, subject to de novo review, ¶ 10 , and we must apply the principles of statutory construction.

¶ 19 & n. 5, , 138-39 & n. 5 (App.2009) (finding reliance on constitutional and legislative history unnecessary to interpret statutory and constitution

“If the language is clear, the court must apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results.” ¶ 11 , (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Our primary goal when interpreting a statute or rule is “to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.” ¶ 11 , (citations omitted).

We will give effect to each word or phrase and apply the “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” -65, ¶ 11 , -72 (2003) (quoting State v. Korzep, *78 , ).

“If the language is clear, the court must ‘apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation’ unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results.” ¶ 11 , (quoting Hayes v. Cont’l Ins.