Cited by

¶17 As a final point, this case requires a

¶ 22 (2003); Brush & Nib Studio, ¶ 36 (2019).

¶ 24 (App. 2012); ¶¶ 18-19 (2003) (recognizing the federal standing requirements, as adopted in Arizona, require “an actual case or controversy”).

¶ 22 (2020); ¶¶ 18-19 (2003).

¶23 “[A] litigant seeking relief in the Arizona courts must first establish standing[.]” ¶ 19 (2003).

Therefore, “we are not constitutionally constrained to decline jurisdiction based on lack of standing.” ().

The Arizona requirement that plaintiffs establish standing is prudential and constitutes an exercise of judicial restraint.” ¶ 14 (2005) (internal citation omitted) ( ¶ 16 (2003)); ¶ 16 (1998) (discussing “standing to bring an action”).

¶12 To establish standing, a party “must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” ¶ 18 (2003) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).

See Brush & Nib, 247 Ariz. at 280 ¶ 36; ¶ 16, 527 ¶ 31 (2003).

¶ 10 (App. 2008) ( ¶ 16 (2003)).

Sun City did challenge the finding in response to an amicus brief, ¶ 21 (2003).

In Arizona courts, standing and ripeness are prudential doctrines applied “as a matter of sound judicial policy.” ¶ 16 (2003).

See, e.g., Dobson, 233 Ariz. at 122 ¶ 9 (“[S]tanding is not jurisdictional, but instead is a prudential doctrine.”); ¶ 16, 529 ¶ 41 (2003) (declining review on the merits for lack of standing).

¶35 Although the Arizona Constitution does not have a case or controversy requirement like the Federal Constitution, we do apply the doctrines of standing and ripeness “as a matter of sound judicial policy.” ¶ 16 (2003).

As an Arizona court, “we are not bound by federal jurisprudence on the matter of standing.” ¶ 22 (2003); see Citibank (Ariz.) v. Miller & Schroeder Fin., Inc., (“This is an Arizona state court case and does not involve federal jurisdictional considerations.”).

¶10 A litigant “seeking relief in the Arizona courts must first establish standing to sue.” ¶ 19, (2003).

But more importantly, the County’s argument incorrectly conflates standing, which is a prudential doctrine by which courts eschew deciding issues when the plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient injury, see , 524 ¶ 16, with the question of who is statutorily authorized, as an “interested person,” to file objections in an ADWR administrative proceeding under § 45-172(A).

But more importantly, the County’s argument incorrectly conflates standing, which is a prudential doctrine by which courts eschew deciding issues when the plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient injury, see ¶ 16, with the question of who is statutorily authorized, as an “interested person,” to file objections in an ADWR administrative proceeding under § 45-172(A).

Second, , the court determined that the plaintiff legislators lacked standing because they did not suffer an “injury” when the majority of the legislature found the su-permajority requirement inapplicable.