Cited by

v. Maricopa County, ¶ 8 (2004).

v. Maricopa Cnty., ¶ 11 (2004) (stating “the usual rule [is] that a plaintiff must establish each element of a civil action by a preponderance of the evidence”).

v. Maricopa County, ¶ 8 (2004).

v. Maricopa County, ¶ 8 (2004).

v. Maricopa Cnty., ¶ 8 (2004).

See, ¶ 11 (2004) (stating “the usual rule [is] that a plaintiff must establish each element of a civil action by a preponderance of the evidence”).

¶ 8 (2004) (“Four general elements comprise the 2 Taxpayers argue in their reply brief and at oral argument that the Department selectively implemented portions of the 2014 Amendment by adopting depreciation tables.

¶7 Rule 60(c) allows a court to grant relief from judgment upon a showing of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” “The standard for determining whether conduct is ‘excusable’ is whether the neglect or inadvertence is such as might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.” ¶ 40 (2004) (citation omitted).

To do so we first “’look to the language of the statute itself.’” ¶ 44 (2004) ( ¶ 11 (2003)).

§ 42-13002; ¶ 19, (explaining the court’s reliance upon one of the Department’s manuals).

a, P.C., (rejecting argument that “§§ 12-2603 and 12-2604 only apply to ‘usual’ medical malpractice cases and not those involving the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur” because “we presume that, if the legislature had intended to create such an exception, it would have done so expressly”); 499 (2004) (rejecting argument prevailing taxpayers entitled to only one award for multiple parties represented by same attorney because “if the legislature had intended to limit the statute .

It has also been defined as “the final value placed upon a piece of property by the taxing authority.” , 295 n. 8, ¶ 25, , 495 n. 8 (2004).

the Taxpayers again prevailed on summary judgment when the trial court held that the County engaged in deliberate and systematic conduct that resulted in greatly disproportionate tax treatment.

a group of property owners claimed that their multi-family residential properties were valued in a discriminatory manner, citing the uniformity clause of the Arizona Constitution.