Cited by

Tax Liens, ¶ 18 (2023) ( ¶ 17 (2005)); ¶ 16 (1998) (“To gain standing to bring an action, a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury.” (citation omitted)).

Decision of the Court ¶7 Under the Arizona Constitution, a party is not required “to assert an actual ‘case or controversy’ in order to establish standing.” ¶ 14 (2005) (citations omitted).

–96, ¶¶ 14–15 (2005); ¶ 9 (2013) (“Under Arizona’s Constitution, standing is not jurisdictional, but instead is a prudential doctrine .

all information that is gathered or created by [APS] and that is contained in [APS] records is confidential and may the courts, leaving them insufficient context to meaningfully define the term.” ¶ 16 (2005) (noting courts generally refrain from issuing advisory opinions).

Although the homestead exemption is not before us, and we decline to issue an advisory opinion, ¶ 16 (2005), we note that resolution of the divergence between the legislatively approved homestead exemption and the voter-approved homestead exemption hinges on whether Prop.

“Waiver of the standing requirement is the exception, not the rule.” ¶ 16 (2005) (dismissing claims based on lack of standing when issue was not raised).

The Arizona requirement that plaintiffs establish standing is prudential and constitutes an exercise of judicial restraint.” ¶ 14 (2005) (internal citation omitted) ( ¶ 16 (2003)); ¶ 16 (1998) (discussing “standing to bring an action”).

Nevertheless, we apply the doctrines of standing and ripeness as a matter of judicial restraint to ensure courts “refrain from issuing advisory opinions, that cases be ripe for decision and not moot, and that issues be fully developed between true adversaries.” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 8 (2019) ( ¶ 16 (2005)).

Our courts exercise restraint to ensure they “refrain from issuing advisory opinions, that cases be ripe for decision and not moot, and that issues be fully developed between true adversaries.” ¶ 16 (2005).

-96, ¶¶ 14-15 (2005) (stating that standing raises prudential concerns and is only waived "on rare occasions").

¶ 14 (2005) (standing in Arizona is prudential not jurisdictional).

¶ 16 (2005) (Arizona “courts refrain from issuing advisory opinions.”).

Bennett v. Brownlow , , 196 ¶ 16, , 463 (2005).

See Bennett v. Brownlow , , 196 ¶ 14

¶ 16 (2005) (noting in the context of standing the desirability that “issues be fully developed between true adversaries”).

¶13 To have standing to sue, a plaintiff must show a “particularized injury to themselves.” ¶ 17 (2005) (citations omitted).

The requirement of standing “is consistent with notions of judicial restraint and ensures that courts refrain from issuing advisory opinions, that eases be ripe for decision and not moot, and that issues be fully developed between true adversaries.” Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 * ¶ 16 , see also County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 165 Cal.App.4th 798 , 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 472-73 (2008) (county has no standing to raise hypothetical constitutional infirmities of a statute when statute did not caus

("To establish standing, we require that petitioners show a particularized injury to themselves.") ¶ 13 Second, to the extent Glassel properly and sufficiently argues that his own procedural due process rights have been violated, we summarily reject this assertion.

("To establish standing, we require that petitioners show a particularized injury to themselves.").

-96, ¶¶ 14-16 , -63 (2005) (stating that standing raises prudential concerns and is only waived “on rare occasions”).

¶ 8 Although the Arizona Constitution does not mandate “an actual ‘case or controversy’ in order to establish standing,” ¶ 14 , “as a matter of sound judicial policy, ...