Haywood Securities, Inc. v. Ehrlich

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

HAYWOOD SECURITIES, INC., ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-06-0280-SA
Petitioner, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 05-0457
HONS. SUSAN A. EHRLICH, DANIEL A. )
BARKER, and G. MURRAY SNOW, ) Maricopa County
JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, ) Superior Court
DIVISION ONE, OF THE STATE OF ) No. CV2002-022196
ARIZONA, )
)
Respondent Judges, )
) O P I N I O N
PETER J. WORKUM and JOANNE E. )
WORKUM, )
)
Real Parties in Interest. )
)
__________________________________)

Order of the Court of Appeals, Division One
Dated March 10, 2006

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED; ORDER VACATED; REMANDED
________________________________________________________________

GALLAGHER & KENNEDY, P.A. Phoenix
By Kevin E. O’Malley
Mark A. Fuller
Attorneys for Haywood Securities, Inc.

LAW OFFICE OF LINDA D. SKON Mesa
By Linda D. Skon
Attorney for Peter J. Workum and Joanne E. Workum
________________________________________________________________

R Y A N, Justice

¶1 A judgment is appealable under Arizona Revised

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101 (2003) only if it complies

with the requirements of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a).
State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 112, 392 P.2d 775, 777

(1964). Rule 58(a) requires that “all judgments shall be in

writing and signed by a judge.”

¶2 In this case, we must decide whether a typed signature

of a judge in the “/s/ Name” format on an electronically filed

judgment complies with the requirement of Rule 58(a) that

judgments be “signed.” We hold that it does.

I

A

¶3 At issue is the validity of two judgments dismissing

claims brought by Peter and Joanne Workum against Haywood

Securities, Inc., a Canadian company. After Haywood moved to

dismiss, the superior court issued a “Judgment” on July 17,

2004, dismissing the Workums’ claims against Haywood with

prejudice based on a forum selection clause providing that legal

disputes must be resolved in British Columbia. The Workums did

not appeal. Instead, on August 16, 2004, they filed an amended

complaint in which they attempted to reassert claims against

Haywood. The superior court again dismissed all claims against

Haywood in a second “Judgment” on May 26, 2005, once again

citing the forum selection clause.

¶4 This case had been assigned to the Maricopa County

Superior Court’s Experimental Complex Civil Litigation Court.

See Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2002-107. In accordance

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with the procedures established for the Complex Civil Litigation

Court, the superior court judge issued both the July 17 and May

26 judgments electronically, with “/s/ Kenneth L. Fields”

appearing on the signature line. The title “Superior Court

Judge” appears below the signature line. All parties in this

case initially treated both judgments as validly signed final

judgments.

B

¶5 The Workums timely appealed the May 26 judgment. The

court of appeals denied Haywood’s motion to dismiss the appeal,

but held that the unappealed July 17 judgment was a final

judgment and that the Workums’ appeal from the May 26 judgment

could proceed only as to issues that could not have been raised

on appeal from the July 17 judgment. The Workums then filed a

“Request for Determination of Jurisdiction,” and the court of

appeals reversed itself, holding that neither the July 17 nor

the May 26 judgment was final because neither was manually

“signed.” The court of appeals suspended the appeal and

revested jurisdiction in the superior court so the judge could

manually sign the two judgments; the court indicated that it

would reinstate the appeal once it received the signed

judgments. Haywood then filed this petition for special action.

C

¶6 Special action review by this Court is discretionary.

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State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 437, ¶ 24, 55 P.3d 774, 780

(2002). We accept jurisdiction because this is a matter of

first impression, concerns a pure question of law, and is of

statewide significance. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke,

204 Ariz. 251, 252, ¶ 3, 63 P.3d 282, 283 (2003). Moreover,

this situation is likely to recur in cases that proceed under

electronic filing and case management systems. Under such

circumstances, we conclude that special action review is

appropriate. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a).

¶7 We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3), of

the Arizona Constitution and Rule 4(a), of the Arizona Rules of

Procedure for Special Actions.

II

A

¶8 The portion of the court of appeals’ order holding

that electronic signatures do not satisfy the requirements of

Rule 58(a) provides as follows:

Pursuant to Rule 58(a), Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure, a judgment is not final for appeal purposes
unless it is in writing, signed by a judge or
commissioner, and filed with the clerk of the court.
See O’Brien v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 102
Ariz. 570, 572, 435 P.2d 44, 46 (1967). The typed
name of a judge does not fulfill this requirement.
This court concludes that neither Arizona Supreme
Court Rule 124 nor Arizona’s Electronic Transactions
Act, A.R.S. §§ 44-7001 et seq., addresses or changes
the requirements of Rule 58(a). Here, the parties
agree that the judge has not manually signed any of

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 the judgments that are on appeal. Therefore, this
appeal is premature.

Workum v. Raymond, 1 CA-CV 05-0457, at 1-2 (order dated March

10, 2006).

B

¶9 The right to appeal “can only be given or denied by

[the] constitution or the legislature of the state.”

Birmingham, 96 Ariz. at 111, 392 P.2d at 776. The legislature

has provided that an appeal lies from “a final judgment entered

in . . . superior court.” A.R.S. § 12-2101(B). Rule 54(a) in

turn defines judgment as including “a decree and an order from

which an appeal lies.” And Rule 58(a) requires that such a

decree or order, to be appealable, must be reduced to writing,

signed by a judge, and filed with the clerk of the court. See

also Birmingham, 96 Ariz. at 112, 392 P.2d at 777. If a judge’s

decree or order complies with the requirements of Rules 54(a)

and 58(a), then it is an appealable judgment. Id. The parties

agree that these judgments meet the requirements of Rule 54(a).

The only issue in this matter is whether an electronically

signed judgment satisfies Rule 58(a).

C

¶10 Rules promulgated by this court are subject to general

principles of statutory interpretation. State ex rel. Romley v.

Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 167, 168-69, 812 P.2d 985, 986-87

5
(1991). When a rule’s language is unambiguous, “we need look no

further than that language to determine the drafters’ intent.”

Id. at 169, 812 P.2d at 987. “Such unambiguous language will be

given its usual, ordinary meaning unless doing so creates an

absurd result.” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 47, ¶ 23, 97

P.3d 865, 872 (2004).

¶11 Rule 58(a) was amended in 1961 to require that final

judgments be “in writing and signed by a judge.” Ariz. R. Civ.

P. 58 (a), State Bar Comm. Notes to 1961 Amendment. The phrase

“signed by a judge” is not defined in Rule 58(a) or elsewhere in

the rules; therefore we look to the usual, ordinary meaning of

the word “signed” to interpret the rule. See Aguilar, 209 Ariz.

at 47, ¶ 23, 97 P.3d at 872.

¶12 The court of appeals apparently assumed that “signed”

means only a manual signature. In fact, the ordinary

understanding of “signed” is not so limited. For example, under

the statute of frauds, a document is valid “if it is signed by

the person to be charged by any of the known modes of impressing

a name on paper, namely, by writing, printing, lithographing, or

other such mode, provided the same is done with the intention of

signing.” Bishop v. Norell, 88 Ariz. 148, 151, 353 P.2d 1022,

1025 (1960) (emphasis added).

¶13 Bishop’s recognition that “signed” is not limited to

manual, handwritten signatures comports with earlier Arizona

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case law and secondary sources interpreting the term “signed”

more generally. In a case involving whether facsimile

signatures of the treasurer on bonds were valid, this Court

turned to the following definition:

The signature may be written by hand, or printed, or
stamped, or typewritten, or engraved, or photographed,
or cut from one instrument and attached to another. A
signature lithographed on an instrument by a party is
sufficient for the purpose of signing it, and it has
been held that it is immaterial with what kind of an
instrument a signature is made.

Maricopa County v. Osborn, 60 Ariz. 290, 300-01, 136 P.2d 270,

274 (1943) (quoting 58 C.J. 729, ¶ 17); see also Black’s Law

Dictionary 1552 (De Luxe 4th ed. 1957) (defining “sign” to mean,

among other things, “[t]o attach a name or cause it to be

attached to a writing by any of the known methods of impressing

a name on paper”).

¶14 In addition, in construing whether the requirements of

Rule 58(a) have been met, this Court has historically focused on

the intent of the judge. See Devenir Assocs. v. City of

Phoenix, 169 Ariz. 500, 504, 821 P.2d 161, 165 (1991) (holding

that a document entitled “OPINION” was not final and appealable

because the superior court judge did not intend it to be); Focal

Point, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 149 Ariz. 128, 129, 717 P.2d

432, 433 (1986) (finding minute entry a valid judgment because

the trial court signed the written minute entry order and titled

it “JUDGMENT,” demonstrating the intent that the order serve as

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an appealable judgment).

¶15 The phrase “signed by a judge” as used in Rule 58(a)

therefore encompasses more than manual signatures. Nothing in

the Rules of Civil Procedure or our case law prohibits judgments

from being signed electronically. Instead, the defining

characteristic of the requirement that a judgment be “signed” is

that the document has affixed to it in some form the name of the

judge that evidences an intention of authentication. By

affixing “/s/ Kenneth L. Fields” to the two orders, the judge

here clearly demonstrated his intent to authenticate both

documents, and therefore “signed” them for purposes of Rule

58(a). Also, as the parties agree, the language of those orders

expressly states that they were meant to be final judgments for

purposes of Rule 58(a).

III

¶16 We also observe that the policies expressed in Arizona

Rule of the Supreme Court 124 and administrative orders

promulgated by this Court and the Maricopa County Superior Court

pertaining to the electronic filing of court documents are

consistent with our holding that Rule 58(a) is satisfied when a

judge electronically signs a judgment.

¶17 Supreme Court Rule 124 paved the way for the

implementation of electronic filing programs in Arizona courts.

That rule authorizes the presiding judge of the superior court

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in each county to permit electronic filing by court rule or

administrative order. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 124(a). Section (c)(2)

of Rule 124 declared that “[a]n electronically filed document

constitutes the filing of the original written and signed paper

under the rules governing practice and procedure in the courts

of this state.” Section (d) of this rule provides that “[a]

court may deliver . . . orders requiring the signature of a

judge or a clerk to be effective . . . electronically . . . to

any party or any party’s attorney who files . . . a consent.”

¶18 This Court and the Maricopa County Superior Court

subsequently adopted court rules to establish the Complex Civil

Litigation Court. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2002-107;

Maricopa County Super. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2003-115. The

Complex Civil Litigation Court uses electronic filing and case

management as a more effective way to deal with complex cases.

¶19 Supreme Court Administrative Order 2002-107(1)

designates “[t]he Superior Court in Maricopa County [as] . . . a

pilot site to experiment with a Complex Civil Litigation Court.”

The order also authorizes “the presiding judge of the Superior

Court in Maricopa County . . . to establish additional rules and

procedures . . . to implement electronic filing and management

of court documents.” Id. To that end, Maricopa County Superior

Court Administrative Order 2003-115, section 32, titled “Court

Orders and Judgments,” provides that “[t]he Court may issue,

9
file, and serve notices, orders, and other documents

electronically in an e-file case.”1

¶20 These administrative orders express the important

policy behind electronic court programs. These rules and orders

have prompted courts to create “e-filing” programs under the

assumption that electronic signatures comply with the Rules of

Civil Procedure. The court of appeals’ order, therefore, is

inconsistent not only with Rule 58(a), but also with the

policies of a paperless electronic court system.2

IV

¶21 In summary, we hold that nothing in Rule 58(a) or our

case law mandates that a judge manually sign an order for it to

be a valid judgment. As long as a judge intends that his or her

1
In 2005, the Maricopa County Superior Court adopted an
administrative order that specifically provided that
“[e]lectronic documents may be signed by Judicial Officers via
the use of a printed signature preceded by the /s/ symbol or via
the use of the e-filing application judicial signature stamp.”
Maricopa County Super. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2005-091(6). This
administrative order became effective after both the judgments
at issue in this case were electronically signed and entered by
the clerk. While this order does not govern these judgments, it
does clarify the intent behind the prior administrative orders.
2
Arizona’s Electronic Transactions Act, A.R.S. §§ 44-7001 to
-7051 (2003 & Supp. 2006), embodies the general policy of
facilitating transactions based on electronic signatures,
increasing consistency regarding electronic transactions, and
providing uniform law for electronic transactions. Id. § 44-
7006(1)-(3) (2003). The Act applies to judicial agencies. See
Id. § 44-7002(9) (2003). Given our analysis above, we find it
unnecessary to rely on the Act, but recognize that our holding

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electronic signature formalizes a written judgment, the document

complies with Rule 58(a). The July 17 and May 26 judgments,

which were electronically signed and clearly manifested the

superior court judge’s intent to authenticate both documents,

complied with the requirement of Rule 58(a) that a judgment be

“signed.”

V

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction,

grant relief, vacate the order of the court of appeals, and

remand this matter to that court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

_______________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

CONCURRING:

_______________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_______________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_______________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

_______________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

comports with the Act’s general policy of recognizing and
facilitating transactions using electronic signatures.

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